

STATE

AND

With a correct policy by the governing bodies, these contradictions cannot turn into an antagonism, and matters cannot reach a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces of society. It would be a different matter if we were to conduct a wrong policy, like the one recommended by Comrade Yaroshenko. In that case, a conflict would be inevitable, and our relations of production could turn into a major brake on the further development of the productive forces.

COUNTER- REVOLUTION

on revolution and
counterrevolution
in the USSR

Sh. Kh. Mammaev

Workers of the world, unite!

Sh. Kh. Mammaev

THE STATE AND COUNTERREVOLUTION



*ABOUT THE REVOLUTION AND
COUNTERREVOLUTION IN THE USSR*

*BOOK SERIES "LIBRARY OF THE 21ST CENTURY MARXIST"
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Foreword

From the “Marxist Science” Editorial Board

The Soviet Union ceased to exist more than three decades ago, yet Russia and the world continue to experience the consequences of its collapse to this day. Communists of the modern era must uncover the causes of this event and learn from the Soviet experience for future socialist construction, just as communists of the past did when they drew lessons from the Paris Commune. Relying on the lessons provided by the communards, past communists managed to develop a correct strategy and tactics for the movement, understanding the principles upon which the dictatorship of the proletariat should be built, ultimately leading the working class to power not only in Russia but also in numerous countries across Europe and Asia. Soviet Marxist I.I. Stepanov wrote as early as the early 1920s: “To reveal the connection between the Paris Commune, in its emergence, existence, and demise, **with all the economic relations of that era and the preceding history of the workers’ movement** — that is the main task of such work... any contemporary work on the Paris Commune inevitably becomes, to one degree or another, a study of *tactics in the proletarian revolution*.” So, has anyone in Russia who called or calls themselves “communist” undertaken a similar task concerning the Soviet Union? No, and once again no.

You will find no scientific analyses among the most prominent “communists” (in reality, mere lefties) since the 1990s that connect the emergence, existence, and demise of the proletarian revolution in Russia with **“all the economic relations of that era and the preceding history of the workers’ movement.”** In fact, among such “communists,” directly opposite views are common. They explain the economic relations of Soviet society through political decrees, the will, and personal considerations of its leaders, and not the other way around. Facts from the life of Soviet society that are inconvenient for their ideological picture are simply denied. Both “defenders” and “critics” of everything Soviet act in this way. The reader knows their names: Zyuganov, Safronov, Komolov, Rudoy, and so on.

What facts exactly are we talking about? In essence, nearly all facts that reflect the well-known principle of historical materialism that **the economic structure of society determines its social structure**. Most likely, none of these prominent leftist authors seriously claimed that full communism had been established in the USSR or that all remnants of previous socio-economic formations had been eradicated. But which of them, knowing such an obvious fact, tried to understand what kind of worldview and

what political relations inevitably generated and reproduced these remnants? Even after the complete destruction of the private economic sector in the mid-1930s? Why have they nowhere examined exactly how class struggle unfolded in Soviet society at all its levels, from party cells in enterprises, educational institutions, and Soviet organizations, all the way up to the party leadership and the government? And yet, as is known from the works of Marx, Engels, Lenin, and Stalin, it continues right up to the complete victory of communism, taking on new forms at each stage of approaching that victory. Based on the numerous works of leftist authors, who represented which class within the country's political leadership? At what moment and why did the proletariat transfer state power from its own hands into the hands of the bourgeoisie, with whose help it freely carried out changes beneficial to itself in 1953–1991? What specific economic conditions constantly reproduced bourgeois and petty-bourgeois consciousness, as well as elements of a bourgeois and petty-bourgeois social order, in opposition to the elements of the order created by the proletariat? How was Stalin turned into a harmless icon in the hands of the bourgeoisie even during his lifetime? Finally, why did Soviet workers withstand the invasion of an external enemy in 1941–1945, yet prove completely powerless against an internal enemy in 1945–1953? Try to find clear answers to these questions in all leftist literature on the Soviet experience. Soon you will realize that such questions are not even raised there.

Yet answers to these questions, though not as detailed and complete as one might wish at present, are provided in this book. Its main contribution to contemporary Marxism lies in explaining the course of the political history of the Soviet Union after the war on the basis of the economic foundation, on objective laws that did not depend on the will or consciousness of Stalin, Molotov, Khrushchev, Malenkov, or Beria, nor on the will or consciousness of their numerous supporters. Soviet society and the political leadership it put forward are presented in class terms, based on the position a Soviet citizen could occupy within the social division of labor. Only after this does the author proceed to examine what political groupings existed in the party and the state, what their programmatic positions were, and how their political struggle unfolded in 1945–1953.

And after a thorough study of this work, let the reader try to answer for themselves the main questions: What lessons can we draw from the Soviet experience? How can the defeat of a proletarian revolution in Russia be prevented in the future?

1. Social Structure and the State as Products of the Process of Human Lives

In contrast to leftist ideology, which descends from political heavens to the course material ground in its study of Soviet history, Marxist science starts precisely from this course material ground, from the mode of production of life in society and the life relations determined by this mode, above which rises the social structure and state. Every researcher who has hitherto studied the history of the USSR has always proceeded from political decisions and decrees, using them to explain economic conditions. Yet not a single researcher has bothered or been able to pose (due to class limitations and the absence of a correct methodology) the question of what caused these political decisions, what material motives stood behind them. At best, the reasons for political decisions were declared to be the good or bad intentions of political figures. At worst — explanations proceeded from the very representations that people (including politicians) themselves created about themselves (like Stalin or Khrushchev). No matter how much information a leftist may extract from Soviet textbooks on dialectical and historical materialism, no matter how long they pore over the works of the classics, they have nowhere applied this elementary principle of the materialist conception of history: “*The social structure and the state are continually evolving out of the life-process of definite individuals, however, of these individuals, not as they may appear in their own or other people’s imagination, but as they actually are, i.e., as they **act**, produce materially, and hence as they **work** under definite material limits, presuppositions and conditions independent of their will.*”¹

The political history of the USSR was not only disconnected from the processes of human life that created it, but was often outright falsified. This made things worse. For a time, I myself was influenced by the idealist nonsense claiming that Stalin (and his circle) sought to distance the party from political power in 1936 and again in 1952. Upon examining primary documents and materials, I discovered that this fabrication (originally concocted by Yu. Zhukov and expanded by Yu. Muhin) bears no relation to reality. In fact: it is the precise opposite of the truth. Because in the Constitution of 1936, the role of the party as the leading force was indeed enshrined,

¹ K. Marx, F. Engels. The German Ideology, p. 41.

(before 1936, there wasn't even such a clause in the Constitution) and in 1952, although the Politburo of the Central Committee was abolished and replaced by the Presidium of the Central Committee without political functions, the Central Committee itself, according to the Charter, was obliged to direct the work of central Soviet and public organizations through party groups within them².

But this is the formal, political side of the matter. It is important **only** in connection with the processes of human life of Soviet individuals, with the mode of production from which the Soviet social structure and Soviet state were constantly arising. For the first time, an attempt to link the Soviet social and state system with production was presented in my work "On the Bourgeois Counterrevolution in the USSR." This attempt was further developed in the works "How to Use Marx's Dialectical Method?", "How to Approach the History of the USSR Materialistically?", "Class Struggle in Postwar USSR (1945–1952)", "Money: Past, Present, and Future. Part 2," and others.

Before proceeding to the description of class struggle in the USSR from October 1952 to March 1953, I would like to draw attention to one crucial aspect of the mode of production of material life in the USSR.

Relations of wage labor and exploitation of workers exist until the higher phase of communist society, gradually withering away as this phase develops³. In the first phase of communist society, every worker exchanges their labor power for individual consumer goods. Here, the monetary form of value no longer exists, and money does not mediate the exchange of two commodities (labor power and consumer goods). The worker does not receive the full equivalent of the value produced, as part of the value created by the worker is appropriated by the state (for its maintenance, for expanding production, etc.). Yet the very fact and nature of this exchange indicate that capitalist relations are not fully overcome. Therefore, wage labor and exploitation by the state are called bourgeois right⁴, and the state remains bourgeois

² See Sh. Mammaev. Gospodin Shilov, sec. 2: On the "research" and positions of Gospodin Shilov, which I and Co. "stole." Marxist Club of Irkutsk, 2024.

³ A detailed account of the entire process by which communism develops out of capitalism is presented in my work, "K. Marx's Proletarian Socialism."

⁴ It is curious that leftists who claim to have read Marx's "Critique of the Gotha Programme" never notice the following lines: "*Right can never be higher than the economic structure of society and its*

(as Lenin correctly pointed out), acting as a capitalist in this respect. Thus, in the first phase of communist society, capitalist relations (bourgeois right) regulate the **distribution of consumer goods among producers**. In the USSR, the scope of capitalist relations was much broader than in the first phase of communism, and consequently, the exchange of labor power for consumer goods was carried out not directly, but through money.

At the time of the proletariat seizing power in Russia, productive forces were fragmented across different production sectors (with each of these sectors being determined by the level of development of productive forces).

Technically developed productive forces, based on social means of labor, were located in the state production sector. The latter does not correspond to the nature of these forces (it is still the property of a *part* of society), but it is the maximum possible form of ownership of productive forces up until communism (this is the most collective form of private property): communist societal ownership can only emerge from the development of proletarian state ownership.

The remaining portion of productive forces consisted of small-scale producers, isolated, non-communist productive forces based on individual means of labor. These isolated productive forces could not be fitted immediately into the state production sector but could be united into collectives (groups) with the state providing them necessary machinery (this refers to kolkhozes). These new grouped productive forces, emerging from isolated ones, differed from the latter by collective organization, but were **not** communist productive forces in essence. For kolkhozniks, due to their technical level, personal subsidiary farms held significant importance. By nature, kolkhoz production was commodity-based: (1) kolkhozes sold their products to the state (at fixed prices); (2) kolkhozniks sold surplus products at kolkhoz markets; (3) relations between individual kolkhozes were based on sale and purchase. Unlike the unified state production sector, the kolkhoz-cooperative sector was not integrated, with each kolkhoz functioning as an isolated production unit.

cultural development conditioned thereby.” Law and distribution remain bourgeois insofar as the economic system is predominantly bourgeois in the first phase of the development of communist society.

Thus, in the USSR, productive forces were, first, divided among different production sectors; second, within each of these sectors, they had distinct characteristics (one being communist, the other group-based); third, communist productive forces were numerically fewer than non-communist ones. Under such conditions, it was natural that (1) a single universal equivalent — money — was necessary to mediate exchange; (2) consequently, the very management of productive forces within the state sector **acquired a monetary character** (monetary form of value)⁵.

In essence, the given level of development of the country's production as a whole dictated the state sector's **need to conduct social production in a capitalist manner**, using capitalist methods of economic management. This refers to **khozraschyot** (economic accounting) as a mode of economic management. The implementation of **khozraschyot** in Soviet enterprises effectively meant “transferring state enterprises largely to commercial, capitalist foundations.”⁶ Could state-sector enterprises have functioned differently? No, hence the ruling proletariat extended this method of economic activity to all state enterprises in the USSR. In 1921, a decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars was issued, establishing that all state enterprises were to be operated on the basis of **khozraschyot**. Initially, **khozraschyot** developed primarily in light industry, but by 1929 **it was extended to all state enterprises without exception**⁷.

⁵ In the first phase of communism, the productive forces are still managed by the state rather than by society, but this management ceases to take a monetary form, although the value (commodity) form of production still remains (the direct exchange of the commodity labor power for commodities of individual consumption).

⁶ V.I. Lenin. Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy, sec. 3: The State Enterprises That Are Being Put On a Profit Basis and the Trade Unions. Translator's Note: The original Russian text is phrased differently than the original English translation. In order to keep the phrasing of the sentence as intended by the author, we used our own translation. The original English translation: “In actual fact, this means that with the free market now permitted and developing the state enterprises will to a large extent be put on a commercial basis.”

⁷ From the following presentation it will become clear that the Bolsheviks decided to develop capitalism not through private capitalists (the NEPmen and foreign capital), but through their own hired capitalists (the salaried directors of state enterprises, who were granted capitalist rights). This is what distinguishes the first stage of the NEP, which lasted until 1929, from the second stage, which began in 1929.

The essence of khozraschyot can be summarized as follows:

- each state enterprise receives state-owned means of production and is provided by the state with the necessary material and monetary resources to fulfill its plan;
- each state enterprise operates based on ensuring profitability, i.e., comparing labor costs and results in monetary terms — based on profit;
- each state enterprise possesses operational independence, but remains accountable to the state for fulfilling its plan;
- each state enterprise interacts with others based on economic contracts, in accordance with the plan, purchasing necessary means of production and selling its products;
- each state enterprise has the right to take loans from banks and maintain bank accounts;
- a portion of the enterprise's profit remains at its disposal and enables material incentives (rewards) for workers and employees (the more profitable the enterprise, the better working conditions and greater opportunities for bonuses);
- at a state enterprise, a system of one-man management operates, the essence of which is that all administrative authority is concentrated in the hands of the director (including both the hiring and dismissal of workers)⁸.

And this khozraschyot, with these specified parameters, functioned long before the notorious 1965 Kosygin reform, which some leftists regard as the cause (or one of the causes) of the “restoration of capitalism” in our country. Lenin correctly defined khozraschyot as transferring state enterprises to capitalist foundations. Indeed, these capitalist foundations were controlled by the proletariat (the state) and ensured the

⁸ “The charter grants the factory director the rights of a sole manager, who disposes of all the material and financial resources of the enterprise, carries out on behalf of the factory all operations arising from the tasks assigned to it, concludes contracts, represents the factory in all administrative, judicial, arbitration, and public organizations, issues and accepts obligations for payment and conducts credit operations, opens and closes settlement, special, and other accounts and manages them, signing checks, payment orders, and accepting invoices” (E.G. Liberman. *Economic Accounting at a Machine-Building Plant*, p. 19. Russian edition, 1950).

fulfillment of state plans. In other words, the mode of material life production at khozraschyot-based enterprises was capitalist.

The Trotskyist economist A. Safronov, who never figured out the nature of the mode of production in the USSR, sarcastically remarked about the persistence of petty-bourgeois consciousness in the late 1940s–early 1950s USSR: “... *The second generation has grown up under socialism, the share of people in society who remember the Tsar is dwindling to zero — yet this malicious petty-bourgeois mindset simply won’t fade away.*”

Can the described life process within khozraschyot-based enterprises produce communist consciousness? Can a non-capitalist social structure and a non-capitalist power structure emerge from such a life process? Not at all. Since society cannot leap over necessary developmental stages, the proletariat in the USSR developed capitalism, but without capitalists (from the 1930s onward), within the necessary framework for it. The proletariat carried out this capitalist development precisely through hired capitalists, granting them the khozraschyot rights outlined above. Only this path enabled the proletariat to raise labor productivity and expand productive forces (i.e., its own material basis).

The leading role of the Communist Party is necessary for the proletariat’s control (as the state-capitalist) over all hired employees (including directors). For the Communist Party incorporates the conscious, Marxist-aware part of the proletariat. Through the Communist Party, this section of the proletariat controls capitalist relations, directing them along the required path. This includes oversight of enterprise directors via party organizations at state enterprises (without replacing them in their roles)⁹.

Thus, the proletariat, having seized power, controls the capitalist foundations of production, controls the social and state structure arising from these foundations (which, constantly emerging from them, simultaneously sustains them, since the state is both owner and apparatus of violence — **the state as owner, produced by**

⁹ The planned character of the economy here serves as an instrument enabling the proletariat to control the capitalist foundations, to be its own capitalist. Planning in itself does not signify proletarian power, since the bourgeoisie can just as well make use of planning — and not only at the level of states, but also at the level of individual monopolistic companies.

the condition and organization of the state's productive forces, also reproduces itself as an apparatus of violence and coercion). The proletariat, as owner of the productive forces, while generating capitalist relations of production, simultaneously produces its own state in a capitalist manner. The so-called bureaucratic apparatus of the state did not arise and develop due to Stalin himself, allegedly representing the interests of the bureaucracy (as Trotskyists insist), but was instead produced in the image and likeness of the economic structure. The capitalist foundations of societal life-process, with their directors' one-man management and profit orientation, gave rise to a division of powers: Soviets as legislative authority (proletarian organs) and their executive committees as executive authority (which constitute the so-called bureaucratic apparatus)¹⁰.

Since the director of an enterprise, who directly operates the enterprise, is materially produced by the workers themselves and since the entire state is likewise materially produced by the workers, the bureaucracy itself, along with its entire hierarchy (including the director), is also materially produced by them. The key question is whether the proletariat can or cannot control this entire hierarchy, whether the proletariat acts as a collective capitalist hiring these bureaucrats, or not. The director managing the enterprise (where workers work directly) is directly tied to production. Thus his position, generated precisely by the capitalist foundation, is clear. However, the position of bureaucrats above the director (including ministers) or those outside the sphere of material production remains obscured in perception.

Under capitalism, in any capitalist enterprise, the function of managing capital is separated from the ownership of capital. Within a capitalist state, this duality manifests as a division of powers into legislative and executive branches: just as humanity created God in its own image and likeness, capital, through the split between ownership and management, created the state in its own image and likeness. Legislative bodies, as representative institutions, express the interests of bourgeois society and the bourgeoisie as a class. All deputies elected to the parliaments of capitalist countries, overwhelmingly regardless of party affiliation, represent the interests of various bourgeois groups, pass laws favorable to them, and, most

¹⁰ The bureaucratic apparatus of the state also existed in pre-capitalist societies. Under capitalism, its distinctive feature is that the salaries of bureaucrats are drawn from the surplus value produced by the workers for the state (the collective capitalist).

importantly, form the executive bodies and hire the entire state executive apparatus. Just as an individual capitalist hires managers, his executive apparatus, to run his factory, so too does the collective of capitalists, through legislative bodies, hire similar managers (bureaucrats) to constitute their shared executive apparatus. If the state, as legislative power, is the ideal collective capitalist, then the state, as executive apparatus, is the ideal collective manager.

The abolition of the separation of powers in the USSR existed only on paper. The proletariat exercised its dictatorship through the Soviets, which functioned as legislative bodies. For ongoing administrative work, the proletariat, through the Soviets (just as the bourgeoisie does through its parliaments), hired its own executive apparatus — the executive committees of the Soviets with their departments (including the highest executive committee — the Soviet of People's Commissars/ Soviet of Ministers of the USSR). Fully understanding this, V. Lenin rightly emphasized: *“The more resolutely we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for the dictatorship of individuals in definite processes of work, in definite aspects of purely executive functions, the more varied must be the forms and methods of control from below.”*¹¹ Let the reader pre-emptively ask themselves: to what extent were the forms and methods of grass-roots control over executive officials developed in the USSR, and how diverse were they?

For the Soviets to become a “working body, executive and legislative at the same time” (rather than hiring managers to execute laws), they must operate as continuously functioning institutions with constant rotation of worker deputies within them. This would constitute the abolition of the separation of powers, expressing the elimination of the gap between ownership of capital and the managerial function of capital¹². But how can this gap be eliminated? Or, to put it differently: to what extent must the proletariat develop the mode of material production to overcome the divide between ownership and managerial function and thereby overcome the separation of powers?

¹¹ V.I. Lenin. The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government, the Development of Soviet Organization.

¹² This is precisely what Lenin wrote about, that under socialism everyone will take turns governing, and thus no one will govern.

First of all, all productive forces must develop to the point of forming a single, unified production sector, namely, the state sector. Once all the country's productive forces possess a communist character and exist within one sector, the necessity for exchange disappears — **producers no longer exchange their products with one another**. As Marx noted when speaking of capitalist factories, “in every factory the labor is divided according to a system, but this division is not brought about by the operatives mutually exchanging their individual products. Only such products can become commodities with regard to each other, as result from different kinds of labor, each kind being carried on independently and for the account of private individuals.”¹³ Since the entire society becomes a single capitalist factory, exchange between producers within this society likewise ceases entirely. At the same time, exchange between the state and workers persists — the exchange of consumer goods as a commodity for labor power as a commodity.

These two parameters — the absence of exchange between producers, but the presence of exchange between producers and the state, economically characterize the first phase of communist society. Here, I will also note that productive labor under capitalism is only that labor which produces surplus value.

What social structure and state can constantly emerge from such a life process?

1. Once exchange between producers (and production sectors) is eliminated due to their transformation into workers of a single factory, the khozraschyot system, born from exchange between production sectors, and all its elements cease to exist:
 - each state enterprise is no longer an independent unit endowed with means of production but becomes a direct component part of the single factory;
 - each state enterprise is guided in its activities by ensuring the full well-being and all-round development of all workers, with this goal serving as the stimulus for production (moral-political stimulation);
 - each state enterprise interacts with others as a component part, as a component “building” of the single factory, and the movement of means

¹³ K. Marx. Capital, vol. 1, part 1, chap. 1, sec. 2: The Two-Fold Character of the Labor Embodied in Commodities.

- of production and other goods from one enterprise to another is carried out not through sale and purchase, but solely in a planned manner;
 - the value of labor power is expressed in labor hours, with an exchange of worked labor hours for consumer goods (whose value is also expressed in labor hours) — “*the individual producer receives back from society — after the deductions have been made — exactly what he gives to it,*” while the surplus value produced by workers is directly appropriated by the state and systematically allocated to various social funds, expanded production, etc.;
 - at the state enterprise, due to the elimination of its economic independence and its transformation into a part of the single factory, the unity of command authority of directors disappears, and all workers of each enterprise take turns managing their enterprises.
2. The structure of state power, emerging from the described changes in the workers’ life process, takes the following form:
- the separation of powers is abolished, and through continuously functioning Soviets (without any executive committees), workers themselves *en masse* and in rotation govern the state; elections and the representative (i.e., bourgeois-democratic) system disappear due to the transformation of all workers into representatives;
 - through the Soviets, all workers *en masse* engage in planning and governing the country’s national economy; since planning involves several levels, each level is handled by the corresponding level of Soviet (local Soviets, regional Soviets, and the Supreme Soviet).

Since my current study does not aim to address the first phase of communist society, I will limit myself to the characteristics outlined above (although they do not elaborate further on the essence of Marx’s labor vouchers, which are crucial for transitional communism). These are necessary solely to demonstrate how the mode of production of life in the USSR differed from the mode of production of life during the developing communism of the transitional period, and how entirely distinct social and state structures emerged from them. In the USSR, the transitional period from capitalism to communism had not yet begun, nor had the development of communism from capitalism commenced — the proletariat in the USSR merely developed capitalism, which needed to be advanced to a degree sufficient **for communism to**

begin emerging from this capitalism¹⁴. The starting point of this development is the aforementioned transformation of the entire society into a single factory, a single production sector. In the USSR, there existed a transitional period of a different order, namely a transitional period to the transitional period:

“If we analysed the current political situation, we might say that **we were going through a transition period within a transition period**. The whole of the dictatorship of the proletariat is a transition period, but we now have, you might say, a heap of new transition periods...”¹⁵

¹⁴ That is why Marx writes about the first phase of development of communism, saying that it “emerged after prolonged birth pangs” from capitalist society. The prolonged birth pangs are the very same period, when the proletariat prepares capitalism in order for communism to start developing from it.

¹⁵ V.I. Lenin. The Trade Unions, the Present Situation and Trotsky’s Mistakes.

2. On the Production of Class Consciousness. What Kind of Consciousness Do Different Positions in Production Create?

Thus, having examined the materialist foundations for studying the history of the USSR, I must also characterize the production of consciousness in the USSR.

The dominant ideas in any society, according to Marx, represent the ideal expression of the prevailing material relations. What material relation dominated in the USSR and also prevails in the first phase of communist society? Precisely the capitalist relation of production. The sole distinction — here the capitalist is the workers taken as a whole. Each individual worker remains a proletarian. Accordingly, the dominant ideas must, in some way, ideally reflect this material relation in which the proletariat is the ruling class. But this relation is the most general one. Alongside it, there existed a number of other material relations, already outlined above. That is, collective petty-bourgeois production (kolkhoz production), the nature of relations within the state sector itself, and the nature of relations between collective petty-bourgeois elements with the state and workers. Let us examine all these interrelations from the perspective of **their impact on consciousness**.

1. Communist productive forces, considered in themselves (which is significant for the history of the USSR), are characterized by the following features (which determine the following elements of consciousness):

- **Collectivism.** This trait directly follows from the nature of productive forces. No object, be it a means of production or a consumer good, is produced individually, as it is the embodiment of collective labor by numerous workers (this collective labor, in modernity, possesses a global character). Consequently, collective labor compels workers toward collectivist consciousness, acting as an objective factor generating such consciousness (collectivist consciousness is, above all, the awareness of the necessity to socially appropriate what is produced collectively). Moreover, this consciousness bears a class character (although productive forces themselves possess a communist character, i.e., non-class character, they are squeezed into the framework of class structure) — in collective struggle, workers perceive themselves as a class opposed to the bourgeois class, and this collective framework excludes the bourgeoisie. In other words, communist productive forces under capitalism give rise not to abstract humanism, universally positive toward all, but to humanism limited to the class collective.

- **Planned Management.** Communist productive forces can only be managed in a planned manner — this is their essential characteristic. And if spontaneous competitive struggle occurs among capitalists themselves, despite the anarchy of production prevailing throughout society, every capitalist enterprise is internally governed by planning. The collective nature of labor implies its planned nature. Human consciousness emerging from this reality becomes irreconcilable with anarchism and spontaneity, a consciousness of the necessity to overcome capitalism, since the latter is precisely the bearer of everything anti-planned and anarchic.
- A defining feature of communist productive forces is the creation of conditions for **the individuals’ free, all-round development**. “*What characterizes the division of labor in the automatic workshop is that labor has there completely lost its specialized character. But the moment every special development stops, the need for universality, the tendency towards an integral development of the individual begins to be felt. The automatic workshop wipes out specialists and craft-idioty.*”¹⁶ The more communist productive forces develop, the greater the conditions created for individuals’ multilateral growth.

Here one could also add such characteristic features of communist productive forces as classlessness, statelessness, the absence of commodity production, discipline, and so on, but these characteristic features are merely another, more precise expression of the three features mentioned above, and those features themselves are not separate from one another (they are given as an example). The essence of the matter is that all these characteristic features, under capitalism, surround the proletariat everywhere within the system of production, and, in struggling for its interests, they become imprinted in the consciousness of the proletariat (even at the level of economic struggle). The Communist Party (as the proletariat’s vanguard) merely reflects these traits in **concentrated and generalized form** (i.e., as a coherent scientific theory) and conveys them to the proletariat in the same concentrated and generalized manner, arming the workers with them. However, clarification is needed.

¹⁶ K. Marx. The Poverty of Philosophy, chap. 2: The Metaphysics of Political Economy. Division of Labor and Machinery.

All these traits under capitalism bear a class character. Only under communism will they acquire a universal, classless character (i.e., their content and form will align).

2. Relations of production within the state sector (or state relations of production) were characterized by the features of the khozraschyot system outlined above. What consciousness and elements of consciousness could arise from the khozraschyot system? First of all, it is essential to note that managerial labor under capitalism possesses a *dual character*: on one hand, it is labor tied to fulfilling social tasks, coordinating the production process; on the other, it is labor exploiting social labor (labor extracting profit). These are not two separate labors performed at different times but one and the same labor possessing this duality. A person hired for managerial functions thus also has a dual nature: on one hand, they are hired for productive roles linking all processes; on the other, they are hired as a capitalist (hence their alternative name — hired capitalist).

What does each of these aspects lead to in shaping the consciousness of a manager (be it a director or any other bureaucrat)?

- Managerial labor, as labor that unifies the production process, although conditioned by the socially combined nature of production, cannot form collectivist, proletarian, communist consciousness. Why? Because this labor is not a function of the associated producers themselves (a social function), but is separated from them and performed on a permanent (professional) basis by a distinct group of individuals. In this case, managerial labor power takes a value form, exists as a commodity, and is paid for with money. Thus, the individual character of managerial labor combined with monetary compensation for work performed fosters precisely petty-bourgeois consciousness (with all its associated traits — careerism, corruption, and anything yielding immediate profit, since such short-term gain is the qualitative hallmark of the petty-bourgeois lifestyle).
- Managerial labor, as labor extracting surplus value from workers, as capitalist managerial labor, can form capitalist (big bourgeois) consciousness. The director must invest maximum effort into their enterprise to ensure profit. They are materially interested in this outcome. Crucial for shaping their consciousness is **the requirement to think strategically** — that is, not focusing on immediate gains, but on

investments that will ensure the enterprise's profitability over the long term.

Thus, does it follow from the above that a manager's consciousness can simultaneously possess both petty-bourgeois and big bourgeois characteristics (since one aspect of their labor may foster petty-bourgeois traits, while another may foster big bourgeois ones)? The decisive factor lies in the degree to which the manager is connected to the immediate production process or detached from it. A factory director, being directly tied to production, has greater exposure to the capitalist aspect of managerial labor shaping their consciousness. Other managers, less involved in production, are more influenced by the petty-bourgeois aspect of managerial labor in shaping theirs.

It is important to understand that this position was particularly relevant in the USSR, where a system of personal responsibility (or industrial-territorial management principle) prevailed. Under this system, each manager (including directors) was granted full authority within their assigned scope of work but bore personal responsibility for the entire area. In contrast, bourgeois countries universally operate under a functional system that depersonalizes all managerial processes.

Here, I reiterate the significance of why these details are being revealed (and I will not tire of emphasizing this). A person's position within the system of social production constitutes their life process, from which their consciousness arises. Therefore, it is extremely important to consider this life process (the totality of all existing material relations) for any scientific reasoning about consciousness.

V.I. Lenin perfectly understood the influence of the system of *khozraschyot* on the relationship between the state and the workers, and in this regard, he rightly emphasized: *"This circumstance, in view of the urgent need to increase the productivity of labor and make every state enterprise pay its way and show a profit, and in view of the inevitable rise of narrow departmental interests and excessive departmental zeal, is bound to create a certain conflict of interests between the masses of workers and the directors and managers of the state enterprises, or the government departments in charge of them. Therefore, it is undoubtedly the duty of*

the trade unions, in regard to the state enterprises as well, to protect the class interests of the proletariat and the working masses against their employers.”¹⁷

3. The nature of production relations in the cooperative (including, and above all, in the kolkhoz). These have been discussed above, but I will repeat. Kolkhozniks “actually manage the land as their own property,” the products of kolkhoz production also belong to the kolkhozniks, and the labor involved is personal. Moreover, this production is aimed at sale, it is commodity production. But not large-scale capitalist, as in the case of the state, but collective petty-bourgeois. Accordingly, the consciousness produced by kolkhoz production is collective petty-bourgeois. In addition, the kolkhoz members were mostly former middle peasants (i.e., petty bourgeois).

All these factors have been considered above in their pure form, and it has been shown how different material relations are reflected differently in consciousness. But in reality, it never was and never is the case that each of these material relations developed independently, in a kind of spherical vacuum. On the contrary: all of them together formed and changed the consciousness of all people. Moreover, since the proletariat was the dominant material power, it was also the dominant spiritual power of society. The formation and change of a person’s consciousness is influenced both by direct material relations (place in the system of social production) and by their ideal expression (including books, films, newspapers, etc.). It is another matter that different factors affect people to different degrees, in different proportions.

Just as the law of value (due to competition) operates in a modified form as the law of prices of production, so material relations (due to the peculiarities of human constitution¹⁸) operate in a modified way in consciousness. Since a number of

¹⁷ V.I. Lenin. Draft Theses on the Role and Functions of the Trade Unions Under the New Economic Policy.

¹⁸ “The first premise of all human history is, of course, the existence of living human individuals. Thus the first fact to be established is the **physical organization** of these individuals and their **consequent relation to the rest of nature**” (K. Marx, F. Engels. The German Ideology, part 1: Feuerbach).

material relations¹⁹ existed in Soviet society, all of them together (in different proportions) influenced each person, forming and changing the consciousness of each.

Let us consider different cases with different classes.

1. The consciousness of the proletariat:

- If in the life process of a proletarian, most factors are proletarian in nature, then the material position of the proletarian will form in him a proletarian (communist) consciousness. Such factors include: family (proletarian influence of parents, especially if the proletarian is of urban origin); communist party propaganda (which reinforces and develops values already instilled in a person from childhood); communist books (artistic ones develop proletarian morality, scientific ones deepen the communist worldview); features of the work collective (if proletarian spiritual relations reign in the work collective, the person becomes an active participant in reproducing these relations) and so on. At the same time, each of these factors may have more or less significance (some perceive reality scientifically, more deeply, others only “intuitively”). Here we see an example of how the dominant material relations in their pure form form the dominant spiritual relations.
- If in the life process of a proletarian, most factors are petty-bourgeois in nature, then the material position of the proletarian will not affect (or will minimally affect) his consciousness in a proletarian way; his consciousness will be petty-bourgeois. In this case, the family can also instill petty-bourgeois values (especially if the proletarian is of rural origin). Due to initially instilled petty-bourgeois traits, the proletarian will be less receptive to party propaganda, will gravitate toward everything petty-bourgeois in society: to similarly petty-bourgeois proletarians (he may not only befriend them but also become a blind tool in their hands or, conversely, use them for his own purposes); to managerial positions (which, due to the nature of managerial labor, are dual in character) to satisfy his selfish needs and so on. If there is a

¹⁹ Here, material relations are understood to include not only social material relations, but also the relationship of human beings to nature.

strong influence of bourgeois political agitation, it will also reinforce the petty-bourgeois consciousness of the worker. Here we see an example where the material position of the proletarian and his consciousness do not correspond to each other, and the consciousness of the proletarian is influenced not by progressive elements of material relations, but by conservative ones.

- If proletarian and petty-bourgeois factors are balanced in the life process of a proletarian, then the consciousness of the proletarian will be unstable, i.e., again, petty-bourgeois²⁰. If this “balance” is temporary, then the further life process will take its course.

2. The consciousness of managers (bureaucrats):

- If in the life process of a manager there were more proletarian factors (they were listed above), then the nature of the manager’s labor (vital activity) will not affect his consciousness, and the manager’s consciousness will be proletarian, he will be a communist. And as a communist, his position and his area will be a mechanism, a lever for serving the proletariat (i.e., for ensuring the well-being and all-round development of workers), and he will dedicate his work to this goal. He will approach any directive and order from above consciously, will delve into and understand why this or that order is necessary (or, conversely, harmful, if there are such cases — in such a case, the communist will not automatically carry out the order, but will try to challenge it, and will challenge it not in an anarchic way — by resigning or something similar, but by collective discussion through the appropriate instances).
- If in the life process of a manager there are more petty-bourgeois factors, then the petty-bourgeois side of his functions (the ones discussed above) will form in him a petty-bourgeois consciousness (besides, he may have become a manager precisely due to a petty-bourgeois aspiration to become one). As for a petty bourgeois, his position and his area will be for him a way to satisfy personal (*depersonalized*, in fact) selfish needs. He will approach any directive and order from above formally, unconsciously. For him, fulfilling orders is just a factor for which he

²⁰ Politically (although we are not touching on politics for the time being): the Bolsheviks are proletarians, the Mensheviks are petty bourgeois; those who wavered in between (the conciliators) also turned out to be petty bourgeois.

receives a salary. Like any petty bourgeois, he will try to “move up.” If for an ordinary petty bourgeois under capitalism the goal is to become big, for a petty-bourgeois manager the goal is to reach a higher post. The entire bureaucratic hierarchy becomes for him an arena of petty-bourgeois struggle for the opportunity to receive more surplus value from workers at the lowest cost. *“Give less and worse to society, and get more and better from it”* (M. Popov) — this is the life credo of the petty bourgeois (and, accordingly, the petty-bourgeois official).

- If in the life process of a manager the decisive factor becomes precisely his place of work (performing managerial functions), then the bourgeois side of his labor (vital activity) may have a decisive influence on his consciousness. “May” does not necessarily mean that it will. In general, managers are more likely to be influenced by the petty-bourgeois side of managerial labor than the bourgeois one, since a manager already takes up a post with a formed consciousness. But here I am considering those rare cases (relatively rare, but in the scale of the USSR, not so few) when the bourgeois side of labor nevertheless played a major role in the formation and change of consciousness. First of all, this concerns directors of large enterprises. Enough has already been said about them and the dual side of their labor above. Here I will also add that, as managers with capitalist consciousness, for them, increasing independence from state control, planning, and, ultimately, the appropriation of enterprises into their individual property becomes significant (the petty bourgeois does not think so far ahead).
 - If in the life process of a manager all three factors are balanced (proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and capitalist), then the bourgeois (in total) factor turns out to be greater, and the manager’s consciousness will likely be dual according to his labor. If proletarian factors make up half, and the other half consists of petty-bourgeois and capitalist factors together, then the consciousness will likely be petty-bourgeois due to instability.
3. The consciousness of kolkhozniks (collective petty bourgeois):
- If a kolkhoznik has lived all his life in it and the kolkhoz life has a decisive influence on him, then his consciousness will correspond to petty-bourgeois collectivity. It will be important for him to sell surpluses, he will not care about thousands of other kolkhozes (his is the best in his

view), and his attitude toward the state will likely be as toward a father whom the kolkhoz, as a son, loves but lives its own life.

- Non-collective (individual) petty-bourgeois consciousness can also form in a kolkhoznik (here the same factors as above for the worker or petty-bourgeois factors of managerial labor, if we mean managerial posts in the kolkhoz).
- In the case of the influence of party propaganda on a kolkhoznik, and if the kolkhoznik is politically literate, then the scale of his thinking will not be limited to kolkhoz boundaries; he will rather adopt proletarian character traits and a proletarian (state-like) scale of thinking. Moreover, the state organized state machine and tractor stations (MTSes), which provided production services to kolkhozes and, on this basis, carried out political, organizational, technical, and economic management of kolkhozes. Through the MTSes, the proletariat managed kolkhoz life and influenced the kolkhoz. This was one of the sources of the formation of proletarian consciousness among kolkhoz members.

To determine what kind of consciousness a particular worker, a kolkhoznik, or manager possesses, we must proceed **not from what they themselves think about themselves**, what illusions each of them has created about themselves. Such an approach is characteristic of leftist ideology. In the real world, real intentions, material motives are **expressed in specific material actions of a person and in the actual results to which these actions have led**.

A person may consider and call himself a communist, think that he has good intentions, but this does not characterize him as a communist if there are no specific material actions characterizing a communist. All the more, it is not necessary for a petty bourgeois to consider himself a petty bourgeois in order to be one. We, Marxists, characterize the nature of consciousness (including conscious actions) with such scientific categories (as petty-bourgeois, proletarian, etc.). The petty-bourgeois citizen himself (whether a worker or a manager) thinks in completely different categories. For example, he may consider himself a communist, and the petty-bourgeois in his consciousness will be expressed precisely in a petty-bourgeois perception of communism (“communism for me is pancakes with butter and sour cream,” “communism is a network of autonomous communes” etc.). Or it will be expressed in philistine terms about life (“as long as I am not removed from this post,” “as long as I provide my family with what is necessary,” “I’m fed up with these

stupid slogans,” “I just want to act freely, not to be constrained by these frameworks” etc.).

To sum up, a person’s consciousness (interest) not only reflects his life process but is also expressed in specific material actions. If a person’s consciousness (interest) is proletarian, then his actions (whether verbal, manual, or any others) will be proletarian. These actions, in turn, are a piece of the life process for everyone around this person (just as the actions of others, in turn, are pieces of this person’s life process). The proletariat, throughout the entire dictatorship of the proletariat, has goals and objectives that it pursues in the struggle for its interests. To protect and safeguard these interests, the proletariat uses various tools (be it Soviets, trade unions, etc.). In general, these two elements are characteristic features of what we call politics. And I will talk about it in the next section.

3. The Ratio of Material-Class Forces and Their Influence on Each Other

Now I will talk about the ratio of the above-mentioned material relations, the ratio of their political forces and spiritual reflections, and their influence on each other.

First of all, it must be understood that non-communist productive forces made up the majority of all productive forces:

Class Composition of the USSR Population ²¹		
	1913	1937
	In percentage of total:	
Workers and employees	16.7	34.7
Of which:		
Workers and employees of state farms and MTSes	—	3.2
Kolkhoznik peasantry and cooperative artisans and	—	55.5
Individual peasantry (excluding kulaks) and non-	65.1	5.6
Bourgeoisie (landowners, large and small urban	15.9	—
Of which, kulaks:	12.3	—
Other population (students, retirees, army, etc.)	2.3	4.2
Total:	100	100

Although there were more kolkhoz members (cooperated petty bourgeois), the proletariat was the leading force in society, which controlled all material relations in the USSR and transformed them.

²¹ 20 Years of Soviet Power. Statistical collection, 1937.

Production Funds in the USSR by Type of Ownership						
In percentage of total:						
	1928			1936		
	Industry	Agriculture	Total economy	Industry	Agriculture	Total economy
1. Socialist property in two forms:	97.9	63.6	77.8	99.95	96.3	98.7
a) National (state property)	96.6	62.6	76.5	97.35	76	90
b) Cooperative-collective, property of individual kolkhozes and cooperatives	1.3	1	1.3	2.6	20.3	8.7
2. Personal property of collective farmers, excluding exploitation of others' labor; an auxiliary element to socialist collective property	—	0.1	—	—	3.1	1.1
3. Small private property of individual peasants and artisans, based on personal labor; the primary source of their existence	2	31.9	19.6	0.05	0.6	0.2
4. Capitalist private property, based on the exploitation of others' labor	0.1	4.4	2.6	—	—	—
Total:	100	100	100	100	100	100

The main part of the country's production assets (90%) was in the hands of the proletariat.

The political and spiritual dominance (hegemony) of the proletariat, as the dominant material force of society, was expressed through **the leading role of the Bolshevik Party**. For the first time, the role of the party as the leading force of social and state organizations was enshrined in 1936, with the adoption of the new Constitution. But this was a formal consolidation, as in fact, the party had been the leading force even

before that. What is the significance of the party as the leading force? It has already been said that the party, in a concentrated, scientific form, expressed the interests and characteristics of the proletariat. The party absorbs the advanced part of the proletariat, which is capable of scientifically understanding the objective laws of social development and, in accordance with these laws, is able to move the entire social structure in a naturally historical direction. Of course, this does not mean that all party members were communists (i.e., advanced proletarians). The ratio of forces within the party is written about in a number of works. How did the party exercise its leading role? By nominating its candidates in elections. Most of the deputies in the Soviets were party members, so the party could easily carry out its line through the Soviets, form all executive committees, i.e., the entire executive (bureaucratic) apparatus. At the same time, the leading role of the party implied the absence of substitution of state institutions by party ones. If any economic issue is resolved by a state structure, it is authorized to do so by the voters; if this issue is resolved directly by a party structure, then substitution occurs. The party itself did everything possible to resolve economic issues not directly, but through party members authorized by the workers to resolve these issues as deputies and officials. Even in the prewar year of 1939, the party carried out a large-scale reform, in accordance with which the industrial-territorial departments of the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) were eliminated, which, in fact, substituted the organs of Soviet economic management. In general, it must be said that it was the party that was the main political instrument of the proletariat as the dominant material force. Everything else (both the system of Soviets and the social structure in general) was directed precisely by the party. But the party was the main instrument of the proletariat only insofar as the class balance within the party itself was in favor of the proletariat. And here we are not talking about the social position and origin of party members, but about their political allegiance. Here it is necessary to recall Marx's thesis that **a person is the political representative of a given class not by virtue of his individual position or level of education, but by virtue of the fact that theoretically (ideinically²²) he comes to the same tasks and solutions to which the class he represents is brought**

²² Translator's Note: In essence, the Russian word "ideinost" and its derivatives have a significantly different meaning than the English word "ideological" in all its use forms. We have decided to directly bring the word into English and use it as-is, with the following definition: adherence to a certain integral system of ideas and the corresponding social, moral and aesthetic ideal; consistent loyalty to them both in theory and in practice.

practically by its material interest and social position. Remember this most important proposition of historical materialism, I will return to it later.

The spiritual hegemony of the proletariat was expressed in the fact that almost all literature, all textbooks, all forms of media intended for workers, schoolchildren, students, professors, kolkhoz members, directors, etc., presented precisely the proletarian (Marxist) point of view on absolutely all issues. I will not dwell in detail on the spiritual dominance of the proletariat.

The proletariat influenced the kolkhoz system politically, economically, and spiritually. But the kolkhoznik petty-bourgeois nature could not but influence the working class in return. A vivid example of this is the conclusion made by the proletariat through the mouth of J. Stalin in 1939 that the remnants of the exploiting classes had already been eliminated in the USSR (and, therefore, class struggle would no longer intensify), that “moral-political unity” of Soviet society had been achieved, etc. In the postwar period, the issue of class struggle in the USSR was almost forgotten, and the issue of the leading role of the Russian people came to the fore. The national aspect began to prevail over the class one. Supra-class patriotism developed (although this process was slowly launched in the second half of the 1930s already), which was especially vividly reflected not only in scientific and artistic literature but also in films. The feeling of national pride and patriotism is not alien to the proletariat. But the proletariat **is proud of the national representatives of its own class** and the preceding working classes, and not of all sorts of feudal heroes (like Nevsky, Suvorov, Kutuzov, and others). In essence, this supra-class patriotism and phrases about the moral-political unity of society are nothing but **petty-bourgeois collectivism** (as any supra-classness is, in essence, petty-bourgeois). And now guess where the roots of this petty-bourgeois collectivism come from? Directly from the material conditions of life of the majority of Soviet citizens (who were kolkhozniks). **The proletariat followed the lead and further developed the sentiments of the majority of the USSR’s population** (which may be justified for the period of preparation for war and during the war), but took extremely few steps in the postwar period for its own spiritual, political, and cultural hegemony. A correct step was taken in the field of understanding philosophy in the postwar philosophical discussion, which was supervised by communist Andrei Zhdanov. But a step in the right understanding of philosophy is a very small step in the whole enormous system of spiritual production.

4. On the Production of Class Consciousness. Materialization of Class Consciousness and Politics (Class Affiliation and Class Struggle)

I will return to the above-mentioned Marxist position:

A political representative of a certain class is not such by virtue of his individual position or level of education, but because theoretically (ideinically) he comes to the same tasks and decisions to which the class he represents is led in practice by its material interests and social position.

Thus, to understand whose class interests were expressed by various Soviet politicians, for example Lenin, Stalin, or Khrushchev, it is unnecessary to look at their individual position (all three were bureaucrats, managers) or their level of education, debating who was smarter or who was a fool. And even more so, evaluative judgments are unacceptable here (for example, that Stalin was a hero and Khrushchev was a villain). It is necessary to look at which conscious tasks and decisions (expressed in concrete actions) they arrived at, and compare to what extent this corresponds to the practical material interests of various classes. This is the **criteria**. And this criteria applies not only to individual personalities but also to verifying how much a party named communist is actually so in essence — it is necessary to compare the party's programmatic course and actions with the objective interests of the proletariat (and this verification is impossible over short historical distances; a sufficiently long historical period is required).

Above (in point 2) I spoke about the existence in Soviet society of different objective factors of class character — proletarian, petty-bourgeois, and capitalist. And I also spoke about people who may have the same individual position but whose consciousness may differ in class character, being proletarian, petty-bourgeois, or capitalist, i.e., even a proletarian can be a petty bourgeois by his consciousness²³. And then, according to Marx, he represents not his own class, but the petty bourgeois class. For convenience, we decided to introduce such concepts as **class position** and

²³ For some reason, no one is troubled by the possibility that F. Engels, despite his capitalist position, could be proletarian in consciousness; yet when it comes to the USSR, such possibilities are forgotten.

class affiliation. Class position is a person's position in the system of social production, their relation to the means of production. This concept reflects the **economic content** of a social class. Class affiliation is the character of a person's consciousness and actions reflecting the interests of one or another class. This concept reflects the **political form** of a social class.

This position is extremely important for understanding class struggle in the USSR. When talking about class struggle in the USSR after 1936, some leftists become puzzled: "Did the working class really fight against the kolkhozniks?" they mock. But since "*every class struggle is a political struggle*," one must proceed not from the class position of the warring forces but from their class (political) affiliation. Two proletarians (proletarians by individual position) can be on opposite sides of the barricades — one may be a rebel in Kronstadt, and the other suppressing this uprising. And politically, they are on opposite sides — one represents the petty bourgeois class, and the other his own class.

The same applies to bureaucrats (managers). A bureaucrat never has any a priori political nature. It is merely a designation of a person's specific individual position (a person engaged in managerial labor). Politically, a bureaucrat can belong either to the proletariat or to the petty or large bourgeoisie (i.e., represent the interests of one of these classes). **There are no specifically bureaucratic interests** — from the dual nature of managerial labor it follows only that a bureaucrat may develop either petty-bourgeois or capitalist consciousness (and even this is not obligatory, since proletarian consciousness may develop under the influence of other life factors unrelated to the nature of managerial labor itself).

To use the class approach, it is always necessary to take into account the political balance of class forces among all classes and groups of society — both among the working class, and the kolkhoz petty bourgeoisie, and the bureaucrats. This will give a picture of the balance of class forces within the whole society.

Here arises the question: **what is an event?** The final result of historical processes, according to Engels, arises from the **collisions of many wills**, each formed by life circumstances (the economic conditions in which each person lives). "*Thus there are innumerable intersecting forces, an infinite series of parallelograms of forces which*

give rise to one resultant — the historical event.”²⁴ Here it is necessary to recall what we formulated as the dual nature of the ideal: on the one hand, consciousness reflects the external world, on the other hand, it creates it (“creates” in the Leninist sense — transforms, influences). And this creative side of consciousness, expressed as the volitional action of a person, is meant here. A huge number of people with a huge number of their wills intersect and form the final result (the historical event). However, *“this may again itself be viewed as the product of a power which works as a whole unconsciously and without volition. For what each individual wills is obstructed by everyone else, and what emerges is something that no one willed.”*²⁵ These wills do not achieve what they wanted but merge into one common resultant force, an average force, which forms the development of the historical process.

This is the general position. To make it more concrete, it is necessary to include class character in these intersecting wills. Because it has already been proven that in the USSR there were life factors that formed not only proletarian consciousness (will) but also petty-bourgeois and capitalist consciousness. Having done the inclusion, we get the following. From the entire set of intersecting forces (wills) forming the historical event, part of the forces (wills) have a proletarian character, and another part — bourgeois²⁶. Accordingly, the character of the overall resultant force (the average force), into which both proletarian and bourgeois forces have merged, will directly depend on the ratio of these forces, i.e., if the majority of the intersecting forces are proletarian, the historical event will express the will of the proletariat, embody the will of the proletariat, and vice versa.

Developing Engels’ idea of the overall resultant force, it should be noted that historically this resultant force is always concentratedly expressed in politics, in the sphere of political (i.e., class) struggle (the balance of forces in society is most vividly manifested and revealed in politics).

²⁴ F. Engels. Letter to Bloch.

²⁵ Ibidem.

²⁶ The petty bourgeois and capitalist classes are considered together in this context.

5. Programmatic Positions of the Proletariat and the Petty Bourgeoisie and Their Opposition

Enthralled by postwar reconstruction, the Soviet proletariat lost political vigilance. First of all, the vanguard of the proletariat lost this vigilance. As such, it was greatly reduced in number and, with some exceptions, step by step surrendered positions to the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeoisie itself within the party conquered ever new positions due to the excessive swelling of the party, when everyone was thoughtlessly and massively admitted to the party. First, I will consider the programmatic positions of different classes in the postwar period.

1. The Proletarian Program of Social Transformation

In a concentrated form, the programmatic positions of the proletariat were voiced in the remarks of Joseph Stalin related to the November 1951 discussion on economic issues. These remarks were systematized and are known as “Economic Problems of Socialism in the USSR.” What further path of development of the Soviet economy is outlined in this work? (here I will touch only on this, leaving aside other theoretical developments and theoretical errors):

- It is necessary to gradually **eliminate significant differences between industry and agriculture** by raising **collective ownership to the level of state ownership**. Moreover, this raising should be carried out not by nationalizing kolkhozes by the state, but **by creating a single economic body with representation from state industry and kolkhozes**. This body will initially have the right to account for all the country’s production and later the right to distribute products in the order of **product exchange**. Product exchange, carried out without money between industry and agriculture, should replace commodity-money relations between city and village and thereby destroy commodity production.
- It is necessary to **gradually eliminate significant differences between physical laborers and mental laborers** by raising the cultural and technical level of the mass of workers to the level of managerial and technical personnel (i.e., to the level of directors, foremen, engineers, etc.).
- It is necessary to **gradually eliminate the subordination of people to the social division of labor** by such cultural growth of society that ensures all members of society their comprehensive development, provides education that allows

people to be **active agents of social development** and **freely choose their profession**. For this, it is first necessary to **reduce the working day to 6, and then to 5 hours**, which will free up people's free time for comprehensive education. In turn, to ensure such education, it is necessary to introduce compulsory **polytechnic** education. At the same time, it is necessary to **improve housing conditions** and **real wages** of workers by raising nominal wages while simultaneously lowering prices for mass consumption goods.

- It is necessary to ensure continuous growth of all social production **with a predominant growth of means of production**. The primacy of growth in means of production over the growth of consumer goods production is necessary not only to equip enterprises but also because without this primacy, **expanded reproduction** is impossible.

Additionally, Stalin gave the following summary:

- The leading bodies — economic managers and planners must know economic laws, be able to timely notice growing contradictions between productive forces and production relations and take measures to overcome these contradictions by adapting production relations to the growth of productive forces. With such, i.e., correct policy of the leading bodies, these contradictions cannot reach conflict between productive forces and production relations. With incorrect policy, conflict will be inevitable.

These are, in general terms, the programmatic positions of the proletariat at that historical moment, voiced by J. Stalin. It should be noted, however, that J. Stalin considered all these requirements necessary for the **transition from socialism to communism**, about which he writes directly. This is a gross error, since all these requirements actually reflect only the steps **necessary for the transition from proletarian state capitalism to the first phase of communist society**. But if we abstract from this error related to the understanding of phenomena and pay attention to the positions themselves, their character and essence, we find in them precisely the **objective class interest of the proletariat**.

Where in the social structure of the USSR was the social base of the communists (i.e., the advanced proletariat) concentrated?

In my opinion, it was the self-active core of all kinds of Soviet institutions. What is the core? It is the most active, initiative-driven part of workers in various party and state institutions, engaged in the struggle to implement proletarian (party and state)

directives. These people could occupy various posts in these institutions, be ordinary proletarians or managers of different levels. More specifically, one should distinguish:

- **Party core of the CPSU(b).** The most self-active party members are leading the work in party, Soviet, trade union, scientific, and similar institutions. Precisely thanks to this self-active party core, Stalinist-communists defeated Trotskyists and Bukharinists in the 1920s–30s.
- **Soviet core.** These are the most self-active citizens of the country, participating on a permanent basis in the work of Soviets. For example, through **permanent commissions of Soviets**. These commissions dealt with: (a) preparing Soviet decisions and checking executive committee projects; (b) checking the implementation of Soviet decisions; (c) identifying the needs of workers; (d) controlling the work of executive departments; (e) developing public self-activity. But across the country, only 2 million Soviet activists participated in permanent commissions (the total core consisted of 10 million people).
- **Trade union core.** The most active members (rank and file plus leaders) of trade union organizations in the USSR, who independently carried out organizational and educational work to develop socialist competition, overfulfill plans, improve workers' material and cultural conditions.
- **Economic core.** The most self-active part of all economic bodies and enterprises (ministries, main directorates, trusts, factories and plants, railways, construction organizations, etc.). This includes Udarnik²⁷ workers and, first and foremost, Stakhanovites.

Since the party, Soviet, trade union, and economic core was precisely a self-active core, i.e., acting consciously on their own initiative, it must be concluded that this was the advanced proletariat of the USSR, but the lower part of this proletariat. The upper part of the advanced proletariat were those communists who held key posts in the party and state apparatus and thus could set the communist direction of the entire state's activity. The core was precisely the lower part on which the upper part relied.

²⁷ Translator's Note: An udarnik, also known in English as a shock worker (collectively known as shock brigades) is a high productivity worker. It is derived from the expression "udarny trud" for "superproductive, enthusiastic labor."

Here the placement of communists in the social structure of the USSR was analogous to the intra-party structure of the Bolshevik party before the revolution. The party then also consisted of two parts: “(a) a close circle of regular cadres of leading Party workers, chiefly professional revolutionaries, that is, Party workers free from all occupation except Party work and possessing the necessary minimum of theoretical knowledge, political experience, organizational practice and the art of combating the tsarist police and of eluding them; and (b) a broad network of local Party organizations and a large number of Party members enjoying the sympathy and support of hundreds of thousands of working people.”²⁸ It is logical to assume (and this is confirmed by empirical data) that this very self-active core of all Soviet institutions largely perished on the fronts of the Great Patriotic War²⁹.

* * *

²⁸ History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks).

²⁹ The following statements by the anti-communist philosopher A.A. Zinoviev are of interest in this connection. Having witnessed all these processes firsthand (from the books “Confessions of a Renegade and the Flight of Our Youth”), he wrote: “*Activists were usually people who occupied a relatively low social position, and at times the very lowest. Often they were **selfless enthusiasts**. But gradually this grassroots activism grew into mafias that terrorized all the staff of institutions and set the tone in everything. In our institution there were about two dozen such activists who in fact kept the entire institution under their constant supervision. Some of them held leadership positions and were elected to the party bureau and other bodies. But the majority were ordinary employees, receiving meager salaries and enduring poor living conditions. Interestingly, they **had support both within the collective and from above**. And therein lay their strength.*” “In all institutions, informal groups of activists formed, who in fact kept the entire life of the collective and its members under their observation and control. They acquired a monstrous power akin to mafias. They could ‘devour’ anyone, including the highest leaders of the institutions. **Managing an institution without their support was practically impossible.**” “Although a mass of new people were obedient and did everything that was required (approved, stigmatized, exposed, applauded), at the very core there was still a different mass. This was reflected, in particular, in the fact that **a crushing blow was dealt to the role of the amateur activist groups**, which I have already mentioned. Open mockery of the activists has begun. We have failed several campaigns and personal cases they had started. Denunciations lost their former effectiveness. Many of the most inveterate and active Stalinists began to fail in elections to Komsomol and party bureaus.”

I also point to my systematized theory of proletarian leadership. Analysis of the Bolshevik party experience and the study of Lenin, Stalin, and Razlatsky's heritage led me to the following thoughts regarding the art of leadership:

In any proletarian organization, there are **leaders of three levels**. Here, it is not about formal posts, but about the **actual** functions performed by a person within the organization.

Leader of the 1st level — the ideinical-political leader of the communist movement. He:

- possesses necessary knowledge in all components of Marxism and methodology;
- can and does make fundamental scientific discoveries in all these areas;
- can generalize the organization's work in theoretical and practical activities;
- can set, based on all the above, the general guidelines for the organization's development (i.e., form the general line).

All the mentioned characteristics had to be integral, embodied in one person, who, thanks to this integrity, became the ideinical-political leader of the movement and set the **general** direction for the entire activity.

Leaders of the 2nd level. They take the guidelines of the first-level leader, deeply understand them, implement the direction given to them in their special areas, and put his guidelines into practice (at the general organizational level).

Leaders of the 3rd level. They don't possess the ability for serious organizational work and the deep understanding of the line drawn by the first-level leader. However, they accomplish the line on site, and have personal charm, charisma that allows them to influence the organization's lower masses.

Leaders of each level bear a moral responsibility before the organization. Oftentimes they're put in the formal positions and bear the corresponding organizational responsibility. It is this kind of system that is also completely realized in our organization.

2. Right-Opportunist Programmatic Policies

Just like right opportunism, left opportunism is by its class nature a realization of the petty bourgeoisie's interests. I have said before which factors of the life process

have bred petty bourgeois citizens and their petty bourgeois demands. Here, I'll only speak about the concentrated, i.e., political, materialization of these demands.

It must be said that before the March 1953 counterrevolution these demands were impossible to openly tell by anyone (with rare exceptions). Moreover, everyone who told them afterwards were doing their best to praise and support the proletarian programme points while under the proletarian power (unsurprising, since proletariat was the master, and it was the master who hired all these employees to work for him). I'll begin with the right opportunism, and firstly, mention to the reader what it represents in the proletariat's state.

Right opportunism (Bukharinism) is the materialization of the interests of the part of the petty bourgeoisie that resists the progress, clings to every remaining trace of capitalism in the people's economy and wishes to preserve, and moreover, develop these traces, because their preservation and development means the very existence of all these petty bourgeois citizens, because these remnants are what have formed them as petty bourgeoisie.

Right opportunists' program demands were voiced over by Malenkov on the IVth (March 1953) and Vth (August 1953) sessions of the 3rd Congress of the Supreme Soviet, and his several other speeches. All of these can be reduced to the following points:

- It is necessary to **develop the private subsidiary farms**, increase their profitability and simultaneously develop the material stimulation in the kolkhozes³⁰. If the proletarian program called for the opposite, developing the kolkhozes in order to decrease the role of the subsidiary farming and gradually create conditions for uplifting the kolkhozes to the state level, Malenkov considers this politics to be wrong (as he himself says it). According to him, the correct approach is to develop the elements of kolkhozes that are connected to the **preservation of the commodity exchange and material interest**.
- It is important to enlarge the ministries and widen their rights under the premise of saving the budget. While under its rule the proletariat had been constantly breaking up the ministries, cutting down their powers of authority

³⁰ Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 3rd convocation, 5th session (August 5–8, 1953): Verbatim Report, p. 269. Available in Russian.

and thus ensuring the role and powers of authority for the Supreme Soviet, Malenkov and his comrades decided to act in the opposite direction³¹. As a reminder, increasing the role of the Soviets system and decreasing the one for the executive (bureaucratic) apparatus is one of the instruments in the hands of the proletariat for overcoming the difference between the people of intellectual and physical labor.

- It is necessary to develop the **commodity exchange**, take all measures to **increase the trade**³². While proletarian politics call for replacement of the commodity exchange with direct product exchange system, Malenkov considers the current trade level insufficient and trade “*will remain the principal form of distributing consumer goods among members of socialist society for a long time to come.*”³³
- It is necessary to develop the **consumer goods production**, enforce the light industry development, to make its development pace coincide with the development of heavy industry. This position was the direct opposite of the principle of the proletarian program that prioritized the development of the means of production. And this is directly connected with the trade development point, since the light industry is the base for the commodity-money relations, since it produces goods to sell them (while the heavy industry products, i.e., means of production, are distributed by the state plan).

I have already stated which section of the petty bourgeoisie is represented by right opportunism. Now it is necessary to indicate where this section was concentrated, in which areas of the social structure. To do this, let us first recall who right opportunism relied on in the 1920s, when the structure of the economy was completely different. These were: (1) the kulaks (primarily); (2) groups of workers and employees connected with individual peasant farming; (3) NEPmen; (4) the

³¹ Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 3rd convocation, 4th session (March 15, 1953): Verbatim Report, p. 8. Available in Russian.

³² Sessions of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, 3rd convocation, 5th session (August 5–8, 1953): Verbatim Report, p. 271. Available in Russian.

³³ Ibidem. At the XIXth Congress, Malenkov said that “commodity circulation is incompatible with the prospect of a transition from socialism to communism,” and that it is necessary to develop those embryonic forms of product exchange that already exist in the economy, etc.

petty-bourgeois section of the bureaucracy; (5) a certain part of the old technical intelligentsia. However, from the mid-1930s, the structure of the USSR economy was completely different, and we must proceed from the structure that existed by the early 1950s. Apart from the petty-bourgeois section of the bureaucracy, the other groups mentioned no longer existed in the USSR. To these may be added the capitalist section of the bureaucracy. And where were these groups of bureaucrats concentrated? The petty-bourgeois section was **in the upper levels of ministries and departments**. That is why their powers were significantly expanded. The capitalist section consisted of part of **the directors of large industrial, commercial, and financial institutions**. Hence the need to develop trade in every possible way and for the long term. This is the social base of right opportunism³⁴. The social base of the right opportunists also includes **backward elements within the kolkhozes** who did not understand the necessity of developing the collective economy of the kolkhozes and were psychologically attached to their private subsidiary plots.

From this point on, the terms “right opportunists,” “Bukharinists,” and “Malenkovites” will be used in the same sense, since they mean one and the same thing.

3. Left-Opportunist Programmatic Policies

Left opportunism (Trotskyism) expresses the interests of that section of the petty bourgeoisie which wants to leap into communism immediately, without struggle or difficulty. But for left opportunism, “communism” is a communism for a separately taken petty bourgeoisie, a communism interpreted and understood through the interests and needs of the petty bourgeois. Moreover, left opportunism seeks to achieve this through administrative measures. Joseph Stalin once gave a brilliant characterization of the essence of left opportunism:

“Capitulation in practice as the content, ‘Left’ phrases and ‘revolutionary’ adventurist postures, as the form disguising and advertising the defeatist content — such is the essence of Trotskyism. This duality of Trotskyism reflects the duality of the position of the urban petty bourgeoisie, which is being ruined, **cannot tolerate the ‘regime’ of the dictatorship of the proletariat and is striving either to jump into**

³⁴ Let us note that a part of the right opportunists, led by L. Beria, relied on the petty-bourgeois section of the bureaucracy within the **punitive organs**.

socialism ‘at one go’ in order to avoid being ruined (hence adventurism and hysterics in policy), **or, if this is impossible, to make every conceivable concession to capitalism** (hence capitulation in policy).”³⁵

The programmatic demands of left opportunism were articulated by Khrushchev and can be reduced to the following points:

- It is necessary to **enlarge the kolkhozes (and in part nationalize them), and to eliminate the personal subsidiary plots of kolkhozniks and workers**. This “left” phrase and “revolutionary” adventurist posture, as a form, concealed the strengthening of the positions of the kolkhoz elite. While the proletarian political program consisted in gradually displacing subsidiary plots through the development of the collective economy of the kolkhozes (and a corresponding tax policy), the Khrushchevites implemented this through premature, purely **administrative** measures. Sometimes leftists shout: “Look, Khrushchev nationalized the kolkhozes, i.e., he wanted to build communism,” and so on. But, first, the proletariat does not nationalize kolkhozes; rather, it **creates in them the conditions** (material-technical, cultural, political) for them to develop themselves to the level of state property. Second, this rushing ahead, skipping necessary stages of development, was in essence a step backward, since it effectively led to the transfer of nationalized collective farms **into the hands of mid-level party secretaries** (and, in the case of enlargement — **to the emergence of a mafia-like elite within the kolkhozes**). It should be noted that the Khrushchevites had already pushed through a reform on the enlargement of collective farms in 1950–1951³⁶. In 1956, artel enterprises were abolished in the USSR, and by the end of the decade processes began related to the enlargement of collective farms and the nationalization of part of them.
- It is necessary **to abolish the majority of ministries and transfer their powers to the sovnarkhozes**. These were established in 1957 and represented economic and administrative bodies at the level of regions across the entire USSR. This marked a transition from a sectoral system of industrial management to a territorial one, which in essence meant transferring the

³⁵ J. Stalin. Report of the CC to the XVIth Congress of CPSU(b).

³⁶ See, for example, N.S. Khrushchev’s article “On Construction and Improvement in Collective Farms,” published in Pravda on March 4, 1951.

powers of ministers to mid-level party secretaries. In other words, a “revolutionary” adventurist transfer of authority from the “top” to the “bottom” in form (appearance), but in substance a strengthening of the positions of the petty bourgeoisie concentrated at the middle level.

- It is necessary **to develop trade and commodity-money relations as much as possible**. Even the author of the “Stalinist” political economy textbook, the Khrushchevite Ostrovityanov, stated: *“The final disappearance of commodity-money relations will occur with the victory of communism on a world scale, and in the period of transition from socialism to the higher phase of communism, commodity-money relations **will develop even further.**”* On this point, right and left opportunists fully coincided, since the development of monetary relations was advantageous to both sections of the petty bourgeoisie.
- It is necessary to ensure the primacy of the production of means of production over the production of consumer goods. Here, at first glance, everything appears to align with the proletarian program. But only in form, since in essence this policy led to a large **gap between Groups A and B of industry**, with a significant lag in Group B. Moreover, left opportunism also relied to a considerable extent on the military-industrial complex and **lobbied for the interests of the military elite**, that is, the upper strata of the defense sector (notably, military institutions remained untouched during the sovnarkhoz reform).
- It is necessary to **abolish the Machine and Tractor Stations (MTSes) and compel kolkhozes to purchase agricultural machinery**. Even during the period of the dictatorship of the proletariat (in September 1952), Khrushchevites A.V. Sanina and V.G. Venzher proposed transferring ownership of the main means of production concentrated in the MTSes to the kolkhozes. However, they were met with decisive criticism from the proletariat, because the proletariat understood that selling state means of production to kolkhozes would only lead to making them unprofitable, to their ruin, to the undermining of agricultural mechanization, to a slowdown in kolkhoz production, and, most importantly, to granting kolkhozes a privileged position. What kind of privileged position? It meant transforming kolkhozes into owners of the means of production (namely, machinery). Moreover, this was a step toward expanding the sphere of commodity circulation. In other words, taken together — these measures were steps that distanced kolkhoz property from state property and promoted the development of capitalism. In 1958, this policy was implemented by the Khrushchevites who had come to power.

In which areas of the social structure was that part of the petty-bourgeois population concentrated which formed the social base of left opportunism? In the 1920s, this social base consisted of (1) small owners — artisans and craftsmen; (2) the petty-bourgeois intelligentsia; (3) employees and workers of private enterprises being displaced by the growth of state ownership; (4) workers who had only recently emerged from non-proletarian strata. In general, the social base of left opportunism consisted of declassed petty-bourgeois elements who had entered industrial production. By the 1950s, all of these groups of petty-bourgeois citizens no longer existed. However, there were **workers who had been declassed as a result of the war and were only just returning from the front to production**. These workers, first, had become accustomed during the war to the rigidly centralized bureaucratic system of the armed forces, where strict obedience to all orders was required (which is why they could do little more than raise their hands when decisions were made, including at the IVth Session of the Supreme Soviet of the 3rd convocation). Second, these workers were “weary” from the war, having endured all kinds of hardships and desiring a calm, orderly life without struggle or deprivation. These factors turned **part** of the working class into petty-bourgeois elements, transforming them into a support base for left opportunism. These same sentiments were also expressed by the **bulk of mid-level party secretaries**, on whom Khrushchev later relied. In addition, a serious support base for the Trotskyists was the **leadership of enlarged kolkhozes and the military elite** (the leadership of the military-industrial complex).

The proletarian V. Molotov later spoke about all this as follows:

“Khrushchev had a more solid social background, because philistinism was ubiquitous... This included not only certain individuals but the bulk of our cadres and the masses generally. They were all exhausted. Not everyone in the leadership could stick to the new course, because it was extremely difficult... Khrushchev took advantage of the widespread philistine mentality: ‘We just need more goods! Never mind that they are low quality, all that matters is that they are cheap!’... there. Many would have preferred a more dependable leader, but Khrushchev promised a quieter, more relaxed life at the top. Many went for this instantly. And he made promises to the common folk. People welcomed the change. But it was all deception, though many used the chance to take it easy and enjoy themselves.”³⁷

³⁷ See F.I. Chuev. Molotov remembers.

In general, one can agree with such a characterization of Khrushchev. However, Molotov made a serious mistake by calling Khrushchev a Bukharinist (a right opportunist). Although this does not change the essence of the matter — in their content, both left and right opportunism are **expressions, in different forms, of the interests of the petty bourgeoisie, of the aspiration to prevent the construction of communism and to move toward private-enterprise capitalism.**

From this point on, the terms “left opportunists,” “Trotskyists,” and “Khrushchevites” will be used in the same sense, since they mean one and the same thing. In general, both left and right opportunists will be referred to as the **petty-bourgeois opposition.**

* * *

As already stated, left opportunism is characterized by attempts to skip over the necessary stages of development, reflecting the mindset of the petty bourgeois, who wants to leap into communism (a petty-bourgeois communism) without struggle or hardship. Right opportunism, on the contrary, tries to pull everything backward. Psychologically, the former is based on the fact that alienation (anarchism) is projected outward by the individual onto other people, in attempts to assert oneself at the expense of others, hence the attempts to skip necessary stages of development, the attempts to solve everything through administrative measures, and all of this is accompanied by an inflated self-image. The latter (right opportunism) is based on alienation (anarchism) being projected inward, onto oneself, hence insecurity, self-reproach, trailing behind the movement, and so on. Both forms of self-alienation do not have clear boundaries between them, they intertwine, can exist in various combinations, and in essence are one and the same. A left opportunist, trying to achieve the desired result here and now, upon failure falls into despair, gives up, and begins to act in a right-opportunist manner. At one time, Lenin described the psychology of the left opportunist Myasnikov in the following way: ***“You saw a spate of misfortunes and maladies, gave way to despair and rushed into the arms of the enemy, the bourgeoisie.”***

In the first days after the October Revolution, Lenin considered possible only an alliance with the Left Socialist-Revolutionaries, and on November 14, 1917, a resolution of the Central Committee was adopted nullifying the negotiations. However, the rightist Kamenev grouping insisted on its position, stating that the

resolution had not been discussed within the VTsIK³⁸ faction, and **adopted its own resolution**, in which it formally rejected the idea of a “People’s Soviet,” but in practice it proposed transforming the VTsIK into precisely such a “People’s Soviet.” On November 17, the Mensheviks and Left Socialist-Revolutionaries protested against the “system of terror” and withdrew their representatives from all bodies. Along with them, the Kamenev grouping also **removed its people from responsible positions**, and namely, three People’s Commissars and four Central Committee members (*i.e., hysteria of the petty bourgeoisie: “everything is lost, everything is destroyed,” i.e., an exaggeration of the strength of the bourgeoisie, an absolutization of these forces and corresponding submission to them; in the case of “fatal mistakes” (in reality, minor issues), an immediate surrender of positions; imagine a person with low self-esteem).*

On the question of convening the Constituent Assembly, the left position was represented by I. Stukov, who considered it necessary to **disperse** the Constituent Assembly immediately (*i.e., overestimation of one’s own strength, i.e., belief in one’s own omnipotence to do anything, hence administrative methods; the basis is self-conceit: they must act, not the mass of workers; imagine a person with inflated self-esteem).*

³⁸ Translator’s Note: The All-Russian Central Executive Committee.

6. How Did the Opposition Exist in the USSR From 1945 to 1952?

When talking about the opposition, we usually remember those opposition parties or groups that openly express and acknowledge their struggle for power with the ruling party or group. Within the party, the opposition is expressed as a separate group, a faction.

N. Khrushchev openly spoke about the fact that there was an opposition group within the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), during the war and after the war, at the XXth Congress of the CPSU. Although he called this faction the “Leninist core.”³⁹ It was this faction, according to Khrushchev, that opposed Stalin’s “single-handed” actions. In my opinion, this faction was at that time an alliance between the left and right opportunists. They acted mainly together and only after the final victory did they begin to fight among themselves. But the most important thing that interests us at the moment is how the opposition acted in the postwar years, before 1952.

If we talk about the form of the petty-bourgeois opposition’s struggle for power, then we must note an essential feature of this form. And namely, that **it was not a struggle openly directed against the dictatorship of the proletariat**⁴⁰. *“There was no clearly defined front line or sharp division between opposing camps. The struggle took*

³⁹ “The XXth Congress of the Party and the entire policy of the Central Committee since Stalin’s death clearly prove that there was **in being a Leninist core of leaders** within the Central Committee, who had a correct understanding of the pressing requirements in the spheres of home and foreign policy. It cannot be said that there was no opposition to the negative phenomena associated with the cult of the individual which hindered the advance of socialism. Moreover, there were certain periods, as for example during the war, when the unilateral acts of Stalin were sharply restricted, when the negative consequences of lawlessness, of arbitrary rule, etc., were materially weakened” (N. Khrushchev. On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences: A Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 30 June 1956).

⁴⁰ Stalin, Stalinist leadership, etc. — you can call it whatever you like, but essentially against the dictatorship of the proletariat.

the form of endless minor skirmishes — over candidates for Party and Komsomol committees, appointments to positions, awarding of ranks, and so on.”⁴¹

In order to understand how the petty-bourgeois opposition (hereinafter, simply “the opposition”) existed, let us briefly recall the changes in the balance of class forces from 1945 to October 1952, as described in the article “Class Struggle in the Postwar USSR.”⁴²

Objectively, there were only three major events beneficial to the proletariat in the postwar USSR (before 1952):

1. the final **liquidation of industrial-territorial departments** within the Party at the March 1946 Plenum of the Central Committee;
2. the expulsion from the Party and destruction of a portion of the Trotskyist opposition in 1949;
3. the fragmentation of ministries and state committees.

However, the opposition’s position (the “Leninist core,” as Khrushchev called it) grew even stronger due to:

- Control over the distribution of Party and Soviet cadres beginning in 1946, when the Personnel Departments were abolished and replaced in 1948 by industrial-territorial departments.
- On **March 20, 1946**, the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR was created. It did not include the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers (Stalin) and consisted solely of Deputy Chairmen, while **the head of the Bureau was oppositionist L.P. Beria**, with fellow oppositionists N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin as his deputies.
- On **March 28, 1946**, a decree of the USSR Soviet of Ministers came out, which distributed responsibilities between the Chairman and his deputies in such a way that **the majority of ministries and state committees came under**

⁴¹ A. Zinoviev. Confessions of a Renegade. Russian edition. Here, Zinoviev is talking about the period from 1953 to 1956. But the same can be said about the period from 1945 to 1953, which the same A. Zinoviev also talks about in a slightly different form. But the formulation given here is the most accurate in a scientific sense.

⁴² Class struggle in the postwar USSR (1945–1952).

opposition oversight. Communists supervised only a small number of ministries, while Stalin (as Chairman) oversaw only the Ministry of Armaments.

- On **February 8, 1947**, a joint decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the USSR Soviet of Ministers, which, on one hand, replaced “observers” with sectorial bureaus that controlled (rather than merely supervised) ministries, granting the opposition not just oversight but direct control, while, on the other hand, communists slightly strengthened their positions in supervising ministries. However, Stalin’s prewar reforms aimed at splitting up ministries ultimately faced a major obstacle in the form of the Soviet of Ministers’ Bureau for Ministries, **which became shackles for these ministries.**
- On **July 30, 1949**, a decree of the USSR Soviet of Ministers “On the Transformation of the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers Into the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers” came out. Under this decree, the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers **was expanded into the broader Presidium**, which included the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers (Stalin), his deputies, the USSR Minister of Finance, and the USSR Minister of State Control. This decision, made by the Soviet of Ministers itself, somewhat strengthened the proletariat’s position (since the Chairman had not been part of the Bureau).
- On **April 7, 1950**, “Resolution of the Politburo on the Establishment and Procedure of Work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the USSR” was published, which:
 1. Appointed oppositionist N.A. Bulganin as First Deputy Chairman of the USSR Soviet of Ministers.
 2. Established the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, consisting of the Chairman, his First Deputy, and certain other deputies — L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, and V.M. Molotov. In Stalin’s absence, N. Bulganin was to **chair meetings** of the Bureau and Presidium. This decision was made not by the Soviet of Ministers but by the Politburo of the Central Committee, significantly strengthening the opposition, particularly the rightist (Malenkovite) faction.
- Bulganin, upon becoming First Deputy Chairman, substantially strengthened his position in subsequent years. In particular, on **February 16, 1951**, a decree was issued by the Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers, which established the Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Affairs, comprising

all ministries related to military and military-industrial matters. N.A. Bulganin became the chairman of this Bureau. Under the same decree, the oppositionists Bulganin, Beria, and Malenkov gained the ability to review and decide on current matters in the Soviet of Ministers and to issue directives under Stalin's signature. De facto, **full control over the government passed into the hands of the opposition, specifically its right wing.**

From all this, it follows that the "Leninist core" step by step strengthened its positions in the Party and the government. Since the majority of seats in the Politburo of the Central Committee were held by oppositionists, they could impose any decisions on the government. Through precisely such "petty" struggles over personnel and titles, through the creation of additional bureaucratic appendages in the Soviet of Ministers, they gradually took full control of the Soviet of Ministers. Such were the results of the class struggle from 1945 to 1952.

7. Class Struggle in the USSR From October 1952 to March 1953

The bourgeois counterrevolution in the USSR went through two phases, two stages: from October 16, 1952, to February 28, 1953 — the stage of seizure and consolidation of power by the petty bourgeoisie within the CPSU; from March 1 to March 5, 1953 — the stage of preparation and seizure of power in the central institutions of the USSR's executive apparatus.

First of all, we must recall here the XIXth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and its key political decisions.

First, changes were made to the **Party Charter**. A detailed analysis of this Charter was provided in the article “**On the Intra-Party Counterrevolution in the CPSU.**” If we speak of the most significant changes in the Charter, we must point to the following two: (1) the right of criticism and self-criticism was turned into an obligation of criticism and self-criticism; (2) the Politburo of the Central Committee and the Orgburo of the Central Committee were abolished, and in their place, a Presidium of the Central Committee without political functions was created. These changes reflected the objective interest of the proletariat in: (1) purging the entire Party, which had been filled with random people in the postwar years; (2) destroying the influence of Party structures on decision-making in the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR (particularly on the decisions of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers, Joseph Stalin). These two amendments were interconnected — the Party needed to be purged, and until it was cleansed, **it should not make decisions for the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, as it had done before.**

Second, a decision was made **to revise the Party program**. For this purpose, a special commission was formed, headed by J. Stalin. In drafting the Party program, which reflected the objective interest of the proletariat, the commission was to be guided by the principles from J. Stalin's “Economic Problems...”⁴³

⁴³ J. Stalin. Economic Problems of the USSR.

Third, the Congress elected a new composition of the Party's Central Committee. What can be said about the new composition of the Central Committee? Here, two important facts must be recalled.

The first fact is that after the war, **“a crushing blow was dealt to the role of the amateur activist groups... Open mockery of the activists has begun. We have failed several campaigns and personal cases they had started. Denunciations lost their former effectiveness. Many of the most inveterate and active Stalinists began to fail in elections to Komsomol and party bureaus.”**⁴⁴ The main body of the self-directed activists, this backbone of the communists in higher instances, perished on the war fronts. As of January 1, 1941, the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had 3,872,465 members and candidates. Over the entire duration of the war, 3,821,942 members and 5,412,226 candidates were admitted to the Party, while approximately 4 million communists perished in total. By 1945, the Party consisted of 3,965,530 members and 1,794,839 candidates. With such a colossal loss of Party members and candidates, there was an equally massive influx of new recruits (the same was true in the Komsomol). People were admitted into the Party without much scrutiny regarding their proletarian consciousness or Marxist literacy⁴⁵. The remaining segment of class-conscious proletarians (communists) in the postwar period was already powerless to oversee all the numerous institutions. A crushing blow had been dealt to the activist base. Elections to Party bodies reflected precisely this balance of class forces — where the conscious proletariat was weakened, and petty-bourgeois elements had grown stronger.

The second fact follows directly from the first and consists in the fact that even before the XIXth Congress, the positions of first secretaries of regional committees, territorial committees, and Central Committees of national Communist Parties were mostly occupied by petty-bourgeois elements. Only one major case was uncovered — the Leningrad Affair (involving A. Kuznetsov, M. Rodionov, P. Popkov, and others).

⁴⁴ A.A. Zinoviev.

⁴⁵ Communist Alexei Borisovich Razlatsky was absolutely correct when he stated that the proletariat, having seized power, must know: (1) the key points of the social system that it must keep under its control; (2) the method of implementing this control, i.e., the objective laws that ensure this control; (3) the objective laws that may help restore this control in case of its loss or weakening. This knowledge ensures the proletariat's class control over its state.

The nature of Leningrad's leadership is succinctly captured in the words of Frol Romanovich Kozlov: *"Indiscipline, drunkenness, ostentation and empty fanfare, self-praise were being cultivated, while Bolshevik criticism and self-criticism were suppressed. Alien and dubious elements — disguised enemies of the Party, Trotskyists and Zinovievites who continued hostile activities against the Party and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b) — were being promoted to leadership positions. The anti-Party group fostered nepotism and mutual cover-ups in leading organizations, widely employing and encouraging handouts, bribery and other methods of corrupting the active members."*⁴⁶ Corruption in Leningrad reached unimaginable proportions. Moreover, Leningrad's leadership attempted to push for the creation of a Russian Communist Party within the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), similar to other national Communist parties. It is difficult to say whether this was a manifestation of "Great Russian chauvinism." But it can be said with certainty that, under the guise of postwar glorification of the Russian people, the Leningraders sought to stage an internal coup within the Party, shifting the center of power from Moscow to Leningrad.

However, Leningrad was just one exposed instance of the nationwide rise of the petty-bourgeois opposition. Similar situations **existed in practically all regions, territories, and republics of the USSR**. Even in my native Dagestan, from 1948 onward, A. Daniyalov became the first secretary (replacing the communist A. Aliyev in this post). In terms of corruption, nepotism, sycophancy, servility, and nationalism, he was hardly inferior to the Leningraders⁴⁷.

From these facts, it follows that the Central Committee elected at the XIXth Party Congress consisted mainly of petty-bourgeois party members and candidates. These facts also show that the new Party Charter, which reflected the interests of the proletariat, could not possibly be implemented with the human material that made up the Party leadership. And it should be noted that the Commission for drafting the new CPSU Program was unable to accomplish this, which is logical given the existing balance of forces.

⁴⁶ Russian State Archive of Socio-Political History. F. 17. O. 50. D. 1360. Available in Russian.

⁴⁷ See the letter to Stalin from S.M. Aydinbekov, listing facts that compromise the leadership of the Dagestan ASSR, 1951. Transcripts From the Soviet Archives, vol. 3, p. 620.

Here, a “scientific centralist” might appear and say: here, see how democratic elections brought revisionists to power! Therefore, democracy must be discarded entirely, and everything must be built on “scientific” principles. There can be only one objection to this — representative (i.e., essentially bourgeois) democracy, whether implemented in state or party institutions, always and everywhere reflects the balance of class forces in society. In all representative bodies, there will always be precisely that number of heterogeneous class forces as is determined by the strength of each given class in that society. Actual proletarian democracy, in contrast to representative (bourgeois) democracy, consists of the **direct** (rotating) participation of every single worker in state governance. In the case of the Party — in governing the Party.

So, here we have an empirical reality — a Central Committee formed in accordance with the balance of class forces in society and within the Party. On October 16, 1952, a Plenary Session of the CPSU Central Committee took place. This Plenum elected the executive bodies of the Central Committee — the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, and the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Out of 25 seats in the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, communists received only 5 seats (or 20%)⁴⁸. The 20% share of seats in the Presidium reflects the concentrated position of the proletariat in the Central Committee and the Party as a whole⁴⁹. That is the first point. Second, the Plenum created a completely **non-statutory** executive body — the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee⁵⁰ (about which, unlike the other bodies, nothing was said in the newspapers). One might ask: Why was the Politburo abolished at the Congress if it was immediately revived under a different name after the Congress? This only shows that objective laws cannot be abolished by sheer will — they will inevitably assert themselves. In the Bureau of the Presidium, out of 9 seats, only 2 were held by communists (i.e., approximately 22%). It should be mentioned that no transcript of the Plenum has been preserved, which gives many idealist scribblers grounds to invent the contents of the Plenum.

⁴⁸ V.M. Andrianov, L.M. Kaganovich, V.M. Molotov, J.V. Stalin, M.F. Shkiryatov.

⁴⁹ In the secretariat of 10 seats, the proletariat received only 1 seat.

⁵⁰ RGANI. F. 2. O. 1. D. 21. L. 1. Protocol No. 1. Available in Russian.

On October 18, 1952, a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee took place. If the creation of the Bureau of the Presidium on October 16 was a revival of the old Politburo under a new name, then on October 18, at the Presidium meeting, this Bureau was granted additional political and other powers⁵¹:

- First, three permanent commissions were created to “serve the Presidium and the Bureau of the Presidium” — on foreign affairs, headed by G. Malenkov; on defense, headed by Malenkovite N. Bulganin; and on ideological issues, headed by Malenkovite D. Shepilov. It should be noted that the creation of an ideological commission in itself did not contradict the interests of the proletariat, unlike the creation of the other commissions.
- Second, the Presidium of the Central Committee directly made political decisions: it removed communist Boris Chernousov from the position of Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the RSFSR and appointed Malenkovite A. Puzanov to this post; it removed communist L. Kaganovich from the position of Chairman of the USSR State Supply Committee and appointed Khrushchevite I. Kabanov in his place; it relieved communist V. Molotov of his oversight of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs, transferring this authority to the permanent commission on foreign affairs; and it relieved Khrushchevite A. Mikoyan of his oversight of the USSR Ministry of Trade and the Ministry of Foreign Trade, transferring this authority to the permanent commission on foreign affairs. Additionally, a single body under the Central Committee Secretariat was created to study and distribute Party and Soviet (!) personnel.
- Third, responsibilities were distributed among the secretaries of the CPSU Central Committee: Malenkovite N. Pegov became secretary for personnel; oversight of regional committees, territorial committees, and the Central Committees of national Communist parties was assigned to Khrushchevite A. Aristov; Khrushchevite N. Mikhailov was appointed head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department; and oversight of the military-political administration was entrusted to Khrushchevite L. Brezhnev.
- Fourth, another non-statutory position was created — Secretary of the Presidium and Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee — to which a communist (interestingly enough) A. Poskrebyshev was appointed

⁵¹ RGASPI. F. 83. O. 1. D. 7. L. 71–73. Available in Russian.

(though this is not surprising, as the position was purely for signing documents).

Here, we see an extreme strengthening of the right opposition's position in the Party leadership, which was the natural outcome of preceding events. The left opposition (Khrushchev's faction) received only some important posts, while the majority were concentrated in the hands of the right. However, the left opposition gained control over the Party's middle ranks, which would later play a crucial, if not decisive, role.

Before proceeding further, it should be noted that Joseph Stalin could have participated in both the October 16 Central Committee Plenum and the October 18 Presidium meeting. However, this can be questioned, as there is neither a transcript of the October 16 Plenum nor a list of attendees at the October 18 Presidium meeting. But that is not the main point. The main point is that Stalin was faced with an established fact — the executive bodies formed by the Central Committee Plenum. He could not simply abolish them or install his own people to lead these bodies. Not only because he was not the sole leader of the Central Committee, but also because there simply **were no such people he could promote**. The number of communists in these bodies could be counted on one hand — L. Kaganovich, V. Molotov, and a couple of others. The majority of the new cadres who filled the Central Committee's executive bodies were not well known to Stalin himself. Instead, they were oppositionists — people loyal to Malenkov or Khrushchev, petty bourgeois by nature, whom the existing social structure had propelled to the top.

Let us also note the following fact. According to archival documents, the commission on ideological issues was created at the October 18 Presidium meeting, and D. Shepilov was appointed its head. Then, on October 27, the Bureau of the Presidium approved the proposals of the Central Committee Secretariat dated October 20. What were these proposals of the Secretariat of the CC on 20 October? Essentially the same distribution of responsibilities among the secretaries that the October 18 Presidium meeting had already approved (with some minor adjustments). The question arises: Why did the Central Committee Secretariat propose to the Bureau of the Presidium changes that had already been introduced by the Presidium's October 18 meeting?

On November 10, 1952, a meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee was held, at which the resolution "On the Work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and the Bureau of the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers" was adopted. In accordance with this resolution,

oppositionists G. Malenkov, N. Khrushchev and N. Bulganin were removed from the Bureau of the Presidium and the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers and instructed to focus on their work in the CPSU Central Committee. Specifically: G. Malenkov — in the commission on foreign affairs, N. Bulganin — in the commission on defense, N. Khrushchev — in the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee. *“In the event of Comrade Stalin’s absence, the chairmanship at the meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium and the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee shall be assigned in turn to Comrades Malenkov, Khrushchev, and Bulganin. They are also entrusted with the **consideration and resolution of current issues.**”*⁵²

At the same time, oppositionists L. Beria, M. Saburov, and M. Pervukhin strengthened their positions in the Bureau of the Presidium and the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers. The resolution stated: *“The chairmanship of the meetings of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR in the absence of Comrade Stalin shall be assigned in turn to the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, Comrades Beria, Pervukhin and Saburov. They shall also be instructed to **consider and resolve current issues.** Resolutions and orders of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR shall be issued **under the signature of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade J. V. Stalin.**”*⁵³

Then, on November 17, 1952, the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee adopted a resolution on the work of the Central Committee Secretariat, which stated: *“In the absence of Comrade Stalin, the chairmanship of the meetings of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the CPSU shall be assigned in turn to*

⁵² See the Resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the Work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, dated November 10, 1952. Russian edition.

⁵³ Ibidem.

*Comrades Malenkov, Pegov and Suslov. They shall also be instructed to **consider and resolve current issues.***⁵⁴

In effect, full control was handed over to the counterrevolutionary opposition between November 10–17, 1952. Could this have been the turning point of the counterrevolutionary coup? Why do we speak of March 1–5, 1953, and not November 10–17, 1952? Because one crucial element of the proletarian dictatorship still remained — the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. It was the highest organ of proletarian power, to which its executive apparatus was precisely accountable. All these changes had to be approved by the Supreme Soviet, or, between its sessions, by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet. For the time being, both the Supreme Soviet and its Presidium remained untouched.

The next significant event occurred on January 26, 1953. On that day, a resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee established a “troika” (three-member committee) to oversee special defense-related tasks, consisting of L. Beria (chairman of the troika), G. Malenkov, and N. Bulganin⁵⁵. The troika held four meetings between February 2 and 23, 1953. Most likely, this troika was responsible for preparatory measures leading to the final seizure of power in the country. For this, they needed a convincing pretext — and they found one. By February 28, Stalin had been poisoned and was dying between March 1 and 5. It is an indisputable fact that a poisonous substance was deliberately introduced into Stalin’s body⁵⁶. On March 3, the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee held a meeting, which resolved to convene a Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee in Moscow on March 4, 1953. However, on March 4, at another meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, it was decided not to convene a Plenum of the Central Committee, but instead to hold a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Soviet of Ministers, and the

⁵⁴ See the Resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the Work of the Secretariat of the CPSU Central Committee, dated November 17, 1952. Available in Russian.

⁵⁵ See the Resolution of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee on the Formation of a “troika” to oversee special operations, dated January 26, 1953. Available in Russian.

⁵⁶ See I. Chigirin. White and Dirty Spots of History. Available in Russian.

Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet on March 5⁵⁷. The justification for the seizure of power was formulated as follows: *“In connection with the serious illness of Comrade Stalin, which entails a more or less prolonged absence of his participation in leadership activities, to consider the most important task of the party and government during Comrade Stalin’s absence to be ensuring the uninterrupted and correct leadership of the entire life of the country, which, in turn, requires the greatest unity of leadership, the prevention of any confusion and panic, so as to thus unconditionally ensure the successful implementation of the policy developed by our party and government both in the internal affairs of our country and in international affairs. Based on this and in order to prevent any interruptions in the leadership of the activities of state and party organs, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR recognize it necessary to immediately implement a number of measures to organize party and state leadership.”*⁵⁸ A rather cunning (petty-bourgeois) move — to create the pretext themselves, and moreover, a pretext that would ensure the coup d’état would go unnoticed and well concealed. This is the essence of what people usually notice — J. Stalin died and the dismantling of the “Stalinist system” began. But the matter does not boil down to Stalin’s illness and death whatsoever, which **merely served** as the pretext for completing the coup and initiating large-scale reforms.

On March 5, a joint meeting of the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, the USSR Soviet of Ministers, and the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet took place — the final act of the petty-bourgeois coup. This act has been analyzed in detail in a number of our works, particularly in the work “On the Bourgeois Counterrevolution in the USSR,”⁵⁹ so we will not dwell on it here. We will only point out the following important facts. First, only the Supreme Soviet at its session (at a joint meeting of both chambers) could change and form the composition of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet (including appointing the Chairman of the Presidium). However, the Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and the

⁵⁷ It should be noted that the entire content of the coup was discussed in advance on March 4, 1953, at this meeting of the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee.

⁵⁸ APRF. F. 3. O. 58. D. 11. L. 1. Available in Russian.

⁵⁹ About the Bourgeois Counterrevolution in the USSR.

secretary were appointed at a joint meeting. This was already an unconstitutional act. Second, between sessions of the Supreme Soviet, only the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet had the right to appoint (approve) ministers, and only upon the proposal of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers. However, on March 5, they were appointed (1) not by the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet and (2) not upon the proposal of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers. Third, by law, only the Supreme Soviet at its session could appoint the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers. However, the new Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers was appointed by a joint meeting that had no legal authority, upon the proposal of an illegitimate Party body — the Bureau of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee. Moreover, the joint meeting forgot to remove Stalin from the post of Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers and, without removing him, approved G. Malenkov as Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers. Thus, from that moment until Stalin's death, our country had two Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers simultaneously. The first one was elected through legal procedures at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet (Stalin). The second one was appointed illegally upon the proposal of an illegitimate CPSU body (Malenkov).

The USSR Supreme Soviet was stripped of its power through these unlawful appointments. It was only on March 15, 1953, at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet that G. Malenkov proposed giving legal force to the unconstitutional coup of March 5, 1953. The Supreme Soviet approved this — the proletariat, deceived by the well-intentioned cover for the coup, voluntarily handed over all power to the petty bourgeoisie. To be more precise, they formally legalized this transfer.

So what steps did the opposition take in seizing power from October 1952 to March 1953?

1. On October 16, 1952, at the Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, an illegitimate **political** body was created within the Presidium — the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee, consisting overwhelmingly of opposition members (which was essentially an intra-party coup).
2. On October 18, 1952, at a meeting of the Presidium of the CPSU Central Committee, the political powers of this Bureau were strengthened through the creation of commissions on defense and foreign affairs.
3. Between November 10–17, 1952, the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Soviet of Ministers were brought under complete opposition control.
4. On January 26, 1953, a “troika” was created to practically organize the state coup.

5. Between March 1–5, 1953, the petty-bourgeois opposition usurped all state power in the USSR.

Once, a socialist sectarian asked me the following question about the intra-party coup of October 16, 1952 and subsequent events: *“Why, in that case, did Stalin and his comrades act like fools instead of shouting about the coup in the party?”* Perhaps there are still people interested in this question. The answer is simple. Because all the oppositionists who comprised the majority were double-dealers who never expressed their true intentions and acted on the principle: **under their slogans toward our goals** (the famous Trotskyist-Bukharinist tactic). They all swore loyalty to the working class and Stalin, carried out various instructions from Stalin, but always did so with their own aims, placing their own people in all key positions. For example, Stalin initiated the creation of an ideological commission. All oppositionists unanimously supported it and began implementation. They created an ideological commission under the Presidium of the Central Committee, but staffed it with fellow oppositionists and placed their own man at its head — D. Shepilov. This was the case with absolutely every initiative. There was no longer that support base, that independent activist core that had existed before the war, neither in the party nor anywhere else, to ensure proletarian initiatives served proletarian interests. **Stalin had already been turned into a harmless icon during his lifetime**⁶⁰. And J. Stalin could not recognize the intra-party coup as a coup precisely because of the opposition’s political tactics.

⁶⁰ At that time, Navy Minister N.G. Kuznetsov later wrote in his memoirs: “When I returned to work in Moscow in 1951, I noticed major changes in the country’s leadership. **Stalin, elevated to the rank of infallible, rarely appeared on the scene anymore, but his name was used as cover by those who actually held power.** At the XIXth Party Congress and the famous Plenum that followed, everyone could already see that something was wrong, that Stalin was just rubber-stamping government decree lists. **‘Troikas’ and ‘pyaterkas’ had completely replaced him in practical work, while avoiding decisive solutions to acute problems.** There was no coordination in this ‘entourage’” (N.G. Kuznetsov, *Steep Turns*, p. 87. Moscow, 1995). Russian edition. An active Trotskyist-counterrevolutionary, A. Mikoyan, also recalled this period: “... In almost all cases, **we attributed our own proposals, formalized under Stalin’s signature, entirely to Stalin**, without declaring that the author was not Stalin but another comrade” (A. Mikoyan. *So It Was*. Russian edition).

8. The First Bourgeois Reforms in the USSR (March–September 1953)

On March 5, 1953, the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie was established in the USSR. The opposition ceased to be the opposition and became the ruling group (while the communists, in turn, became the opposition). And the very first reform, so to speak, was the consolidation of ministries on March 5, during a joint meeting. The consolidation of ministries was purely in the interests of the rightist (Malenkov–Beria) faction of the petty bourgeoisie, representing the interests of petty-bourgeois and capitalist groups within the state bureaucracy (the top echelon of ministries and directors of industrial, trade, and financial enterprises). The majority of ministers appointed to the consolidated ministries on March 5, 1953, belonged to the rightist (Malenkov) faction of the petty bourgeoisie.

G. Malenkov justified the consolidation of ministries on March 15 at a session of the USSR Supreme Soviet as follows: “It should be said that the measures for enlarging the existing ministries, for merging into one ministry the leadership of related branches of the national economy, culture and administration did not arise today. **For a long time already, during the life of Comrade Stalin and together with him, they were considered by our Party and Government.** And now, in connection with the heavy loss sustained by our country, we have but accelerated the introduction of timely organizational measures for further improving the leadership of state and economic activity”⁶¹ (G.M. Malenkov. Speeches by Chairman of Soviet of Ministers of USSR, 15 March 1953). Stalin was probably turning in his grave, because it was at his initiative, starting in the 1930s and up until 1953, that the Party and the Government pursued a consistent line **of deconsolidating ministries and departments**. And this was an expression of the proletariat’s objective interest in destroying the capitalist management system: “As regards the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the Party by bringing it closer to the work of the lower bodies and by making it more concrete, the Party came to the conclusion that **the best way to make it easier for the Party bodies to guide the organizations and to make the leadership itself concrete, alive and practical was to divide up the organizations, to reduce their size, People’s Commissariats as well as the**

⁶¹ Sessions of the USSR Supreme Soviet, 3rd convocation, 4th session (March 15, 1953): stenographic report, p. 8. Original in Russian.

administrative organizations of the various territorial divisions, that is, the Union Republics, territories, regions, districts, etc., were divided up [...] It cannot be said that the division of organizations is already over. Most likely it will be carried further. But, however that may be, **it is already yielding good results both in the improvement of the day-to-day leadership of the work and in bringing the leadership itself closer to the concrete work of the lower bodies.** I need not mention that the division of organizations has made it possible to promote hundreds and thousands of new people to leading posts. That, too, is a big achievement.”⁶² In short, the deconsolidation of economic ministries made the management of enterprises more operational and concrete, bringing it closer to grassroots work. Moreover, due to the deconsolidation of ministries and departments (and thus, of ministers and officials), their authority and capabilities were restricted, and thereby strengthening the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet. For the transition to the first phase of communism, the essential political condition is precisely the abolition of the executive apparatus and the transfer of all its functions to legislative bodies (that is, the merging of legislative and executive powers). And deconsolidation directly contributes to this — economic ministries should be broken down to such an extent that they merge with enterprise management, which, in turn, would be carried out directly by the Soviets. This is one of the fundamental patterns in building the first phase of communism, and we see it in the USSR only until 1953⁶³.

On March 14, 1953, a Plenum of the Central Committee was held, at which G. Malenkov ceased to be a Secretary of the Central Committee. This slightly strengthened N. Khrushchev’s position, who now became the only member of the Presidium of the Central Committee simultaneously serving in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. However, it cannot be said that G. Malenkov lost his party influence, as he was to chair the meetings of the Presidium of the Central Committee (while N. Khrushchev himself chaired those of the Secretariat of the Central Committee). Moreover, the Malenkovites still held strong positions in the Secretariat of the Central Committee. In general, it should be noted that the right opposition had controlled almost all key positions in the country since October 1952, and by March

⁶² J. Stalin. Report on the Work of the Central Committee to the XVIIIth Congress of the CPSU(b).

⁶³ Here, we must not confuse this with the deconsolidations of the 1970s, which in no way served as a basis for bringing commissariats closer to grassroots work and did not strengthen the powers of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

5, 1953, it had completely seized power in its own hands. Of course, it did so in alliance with left opportunism, but the positions of the left were still extremely weak at the time. N. Khrushchev essentially danced to the tune of the right. It would seem that the right had full power, so why did they ultimately lose to the Trotskyists? We will learn about that later.

All punitive organs of the country fell into the hands of L. Beria from March 5 onward. In terms of his theoretical views, L. Beria was a right opportunist, as evidenced by his stance on Germany, where he advocated its unification on a bourgeois platform. However, in organizational matters following the seizure of power by the united right-Trotskyist bloc, he took an ultra-left position. Here, it should be noted that right opportunism in theory does not necessarily equate to right opportunism in practice, left and right opportunism can skillfully coexist in these two spheres, as both are rooted in petty-bourgeois vacillations. Beria's ultra-left positions in organizational matters manifested in his overestimation of his own command capabilities and the resulting hyperactivity in reforms. Unlike L. Beria, G. Malenkov and N. Khrushchev's opportunism aligned in both theory and practice (the former rightist, the latter leftist).

Feeling that his faction (the right) had come to power and sensing the complete absence of proletarian control, L. Beria began implementing a series of changes using purely leftist methods:

- All key appointments in the central apparatus of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MIA) and regional Administration of MIA departments were made by L. Beria personally, without any coordination with the Presidium of the Central Committee, the Secretariat of the Central Committee, or the Soviet of Ministers' Administrative Department. L. Beria even effectively imposed his will on the Presidium of the Central Committee in making certain decisions.
- On March 13 and 18, Beria created several investigative groups that took up cases such as the killers in "Doctors' plot," bribers in the "Mingrelian affair," "Aviation case" etc. By mid-April 1953, rehabilitation had already taken place in many cases. Several representatives of the military command and the military-industrial complex were rehabilitated (L. Beria was counting on their support).
- On March 21, L. Beria sent a letter to the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers titled "On Amendments to the 1953 Construction Program," in which he proposed suspending or completely halting the construction of 22

major industrial facilities (these were enterprises being built under Stalin's Fifth Five-Year Plan, the Stalinist plan for the transformation of nature, essential for laying the technical foundation of communism). His proposal was accepted, and the construction of these projects was suspended, including: The Aralichev and Chernogorsk Synthetic Liquid Fuel Plants, The Sakhalin Tunnel Under the Tatar Strait, The Transpolar, Krasnoyarsk–Yenisei and Kola Railways, The Kirov Chemical Plant, The Volga–Baltic Waterway, The Main Turkmen Canal, and others.

- On March 26, L. Beria submitted a note to the Presidium of the Central Committee proposing a large-scale amnesty and changes to legislation. On March 27, this proposal was **unanimously** approved by all members of the Presidium of the CC. Accordingly, an amnesty was carried out, releasing 1,203,000 prisoners from detention. Additionally, criminal liability was replaced with administrative or disciplinary measures for a number of economic, official, domestic, and other offenses. In effect, this amnesty led to a rise in crime across the country. L. Beria could not have been unaware of this consequence, and he deliberately pushed for this measure to increase the role of punitive organs and usurp total power.
- At the same time, L. Beria began undermining G. Malenkov. And specifically, he pinned all blame for past “violations of legality” on Malenkovite S. Ignatiev. At L. Beria's suggestion, Ignatiev was removed from his post as Secretary of the Central Committee on April 5, 1953, and expelled from the Central Committee altogether on April 28. Investigations into “fabricated” cases gave Beria leverage — compromising materials on nearly every member of the Presidium of the Central Committee and the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers, all of whom had, in one way or another, participated in repressions against bourgeois elements during the proletarian phase of the USSR's history.
- In early to mid-May 1953, L. Beria submitted notes to the Presidium of the Central Committee concerning changes in nationality policy. The essence of these changes was the promotion of indigenous cadres in the Baltics, Western Ukraine, Belarus, and Moldova. That is precisely when it was proposed that local intellectuals be appointed to leadership positions in educational, scientific, and cultural institutions (including in Western Ukraine).

Thus, L. Beria formed his own faction within the rightist bloc⁶⁴, which attempted to seize power through ultra-leftist methods. These methods alarmed both the other faction of the right, aligned with G. Malenkov, and the left faction led by N. Khrushchev, prompting them to form an anti-Beria coalition, which carried out Beria's arrest on June 26 and organized his execution in December.

On April 11, 1953, the USSR Soviet of Ministers issued a decree "On Expanding the Rights of USSR Ministers," according to which the rights of ministers were significantly expanded. In particular, they were granted the following rights:

- to approve the structure and staffing of administrative-managerial personnel for construction sites, trusts, and organizations within their industry, as well as for main directorates, departments, and divisions within the ministry;
- to retain at their disposal when distributing the labor plan among enterprises and organizations, a reserve in the number of employees and the wage fund of up to 2%;
- to establish personal salary supplements within government-approved special funds, including increased salaries of up to 4,000 or 5,000 rubles regardless of official salary scales;
- to make changes to project documentation and construction cost estimates, except for key indicators and without increasing total construction costs;
- to retain at their disposal unallocated credits of up to 5% of quarterly credit limits set by the State Bank and long-term investment banks for subsequent redistribution during the quarter, including for unplanned credit measures.

Certain ministries received special additional rights:

- the Ministers of Railways, Maritime and River Fleet gained the right to allocate locomotives and freight cars for lease to other ministries;
- the Minister of Finance was granted the right, when necessary and upon the request of ministries, to increase quarterly budget appropriations for a given

⁶⁴ This group included a number of officials from the state apparatus, such as the Minister of State Control of the USSR, V. Merkulov, the head of the investigative department for especially important cases of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, L. Vlodzimirskiy, the head of the 3rd Directorate of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Sergey Goglidze, and several others. Almost all of the rightist members who were part of Beria's faction were arrested, and some of them were executed.

ministry by up to 10% at the expense of appropriations for the same purposes planned for the following quarter, and to grant, also upon the request of ministries, deferrals for the repayment of debts on loans issued by banks for the payment of imported and reparations equipment.

In addition, the powers of enterprise directors and heads of organizations were significantly expanded. They were granted the following rights:

- to sell surplus and unused non-allocated materials to state and cooperative enterprises and organizations if state authorities have not taken these materials for sale;
- to transfer dismantled equipment from one operating enterprise to another within the same ministry, from balance sheet to balance sheet, free of charge;
- to sell dismantled equipment to enterprises of other ministries;
- to purchase local construction materials produced by enterprises of local and cooperative industry at the prices established for them (this applies only to construction organizations).

Approximately similar rights to those of ministers were granted to the heads of Main Administrations within the limits of those administrations. Among them were the rights:

- to carry out, when necessary, the redistribution of raw materials, fuel, and materials among enterprises and construction projects;
- to approve estimates of administrative and operating expenses and the staffing levels of administrative and managerial personnel of enterprises, construction projects, and organizations;
- to carry out, when necessary, the redistribution of profits and surplus working capital of enterprises and organizations.

The question arises: Who benefited from these measures? The proletariat? What interest could workers possibly have in strengthening the remnants of capitalism? Every ruling class that comes to power inevitably seeks first and foremost to consolidate its political position and develop the material foundations of its dominance. This is an immutable law of historical class development and class struggle. To be more specific, let us recall Lenin's remarks about *khozraschyot* (economic accounting). Lenin correctly emphasized the inevitable development of departmental interests when state enterprises were placed on a *khozraschyot* basis. And it must be understood that ministries and departments were not merely

administrative structures overseeing their subordinate enterprises, but they became instruments for advancing industrial and sectoral interests at the level of the USSR government. The first step in transforming these departments into tools for industrial-directorial interests was taken precisely on April 11, 1953⁶⁵.

Here, however, we encounter a situation where the ruling class, by its material position, constitutes a big bourgeoisie (since it controls state-owned means of production), but in its political affiliation, it remains petty bourgeois. In other words, imagine a petty bourgeois who has become big, yet in mindset, objectives, and actions, remains a petty bourgeois. Under competitive conditions among capitalists, such a capitalist would be the first to lose. And when the state (as a collective large-scale capitalist) is dominated by a petty-bourgeois mentality, there is a corresponding risk of losing in competition with other capitalist states (which is exactly what happened in 1991). Within the country, the entire structure of state property becomes an arena of competitive struggle among the petty bourgeoisie for the division and redistribution of the surplus value produced by the workers.

⁶⁵ The anti-communist and ideologue of the reforms of the 1990s, E. Gaidar, wrote the following about departmental interests: “The nomenklatura of the mid-1950s, now free of Stalin but still fearful of the sort of bloodbath out of which it had itself emerged, tried to ensure against the possibility of another round of ‘illegal repression’... This new nobility was primarily concerned with protecting itself, as an unspoken but rigidly enforced understanding was reached, guaranteeing them security of both person and property, sanctity of the home, etc. This unwritten Magna Carta marked the starting point of the formation of a stable society. But once stability set in, once the question of personal safety and security was somewhat, somehow, resolved, the question of private property inevitably came to the fore... But the mere accumulation of material wealth did not mean so much in itself. Much more significant was the ongoing change in property relations and the fact that the system of managing government property was changing too. Factory directors, ministers, and other high-level officials who had run their respective enterprises, industries, or regions for a very long time enjoyed a relatively stable position. They had acquired a great deal of money, authority, and influence over the years, and this had significantly changed both their management philosophy and their management practices... These nomenklatura bonzes felt confident enough to take a major step — to shed the role of manager and don that of real owner and proprietor... Once tyranny itself collapsed, so did central management. Formally, the system still stood: the rigidly structured command economy directly... subordinate to the Central Committee of the Communist Party, to Gosplan, was still intact. But the reality was different. Powerful enterprise directors, ministers, and regional Party chairmen all wielded informal but considerable autonomous authority” (E. Gaidar. *The State and Evolution*. Available in English).

After Beria's arrest, a new round of power struggle began among the petty-bourgeois counterrevolutionaries. Here, the ability of the competing factions to turn the main mass of the USSR's population — the kolkhozniks (the cooperated petty bourgeoisie) — into their reserve was of great importance. Starting in July 1953, petty-bourgeois reforms in the kolkhoz production sector were initiated by the rightist Malenkov's faction. For instance, on July 1, 1953, the mandatory agricultural tax on private subsidiary plots was halved. What does such a measure indicate?

During the proletarian dictatorship, as the income of kolkhozniks from their private plots grew, so did the agricultural tax rate. For example, in 1948, the Presidium of the USSR Supreme Soviet issued a decree "On Amending Articles 8 and 23 and Repealing Article 25 of the Agricultural Tax Law." According to this decree, considering the increase of kolkhoz incomes, the tax rate on subsidiary plots was increased. In 1950, the rate was raised for households earning more than 4,000 rubles per year. In 1951, even higher rates were approved for all taxpayer categories. Why did the proletariat impose such taxes on the subsidiary plots of kolkhozniks, workers, and employees? The transformation of the petty bourgeoisie into proletarians, that is, the elevation of kolkhoznik-cooperative property to the level of state property, passes through a series of transitional, intermediate stages. The agricultural artel (selkhozartel) is the second stage of this development (transition), where the means of production and labor power are in collective ownership, but part of the livestock and agricultural tools remain in the private subsidiary plots of the kolkhozniks. Only as the kolkhoz economy grows do the kolkhozniks increasingly meet their needs through the cooperative economy and depend less on their subsidiary plots. Accordingly, the proletariat imposes taxes on the subsidiary plots of kolkhozniks. At the XVIIIth Congress of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the proletariat, through A. Andreyev, stated: *"There was a time when our collective farms were too weak to supply all the needs of the collective farmers from the produce of socialized husbandry. At that time it was rightly stated that the collective farmers should be allowed to have cattle and adjoining plots for their private use. Now that this has been done and all the collective farmers (kolkhozniks) have been given cows and plots of land for their own use, and the collective farms (kolkhozes) are firmly on their feet, **we must put the emphasis on strengthening and extending the socialized, collective farming, and increase its contribution to the incomes of the collective farmers and its share in taking care of their requirements.** The correct combination of personal interests and public interests on the collective farms remains the fundamental principle of the collective-farm system, but the*

personal husbandry of the collective farm households must assume more and more a strictly subsidiary character, while the socialized husbandry of the collective farms, being the main thing, must grow."⁶⁶ Thus, the tax measures adopted by the proletariat in 1948–1951 precisely reflected this intention to reduce the role of subsidiary plots and enhance the role of the collective economy.

As can be seen, immediately after the counterrevolution, the Malenkov opposition began implementing reforms aimed at reducing agricultural taxes on kolkhoznik subsidiary plots and promoting their development. On August 8, during the Vth session of the USSR Supreme Soviet of the 3rd convocation, G. Malenkov presented the comprehensive program of the rightist faction, as outlined above. As I have already noted, one of the key points in this program was the development of the personal subsidiary plots of kolkhozniiks. Specifically, it proposed reducing the mandatory delivery quotas for subsidiary plots and introducing a uniform tax for all categories of peasant households, regardless of income! Moreover, Malenkov suggested writing off all outstanding tax arrears on subsidiary plots.

It should be noted that all these proposals had already emerged in early March 1953. By then, a memorandum titled "On Tax Policy in the Countryside" had been prepared within the apparatus of Finance Minister A.G. Zverev. And in mid-July, the Minister of Agriculture and Procurement, A.I. Kozlov, sent a letter to G. Malenkov titled "On Shortcomings in Agriculture and Measures to Improve Conditions in Kolkhozes and Sovkhozes." In other words, Malenkov's speech at the August session of the Supreme Soviet reflected the demands coming from high-ranking state officials (and their apparatuses), who, in turn, represented the interests of the individualistic segment of kolkhozniiks — the chairmen of the kolkhozes.

G. Malenkov, who in his report at the XIXth Congress of the CPSU(b) had emphasized the need to develop product exchange, completely abandoned this idea after seizing power. On the contrary, as already mentioned, he insisted on expanding trade.

⁶⁶ A. Andreyev. Speech Delivered at the XVIIIth Congress of the CPSU(b). March 12, 1939. The Land of Socialism Today and Tomorrow, p. 262.

Here is what he said at the XIXth Congress⁶⁷:

“Comrade Stalin theoretically worked out the question of measures to raise collective farm property to the level of public property, of a gradual transition to a system of product exchange between state industry and collective farms. The rudiments of product exchange that exist at present, which are expressed in the ‘stocking up’ of the products of cotton-growing, flax-growing, beet-growing and other collective farms, will develop into an extensive system of product exchange...

... The system of product exchange is undoubtedly beneficial for the collective farm peasantry, since it will receive from the state much more production and at cheaper prices than with commodity circulation. Collective farms, which already now use ‘stocking,’ which means the beginnings of a product exchange system, are experiencing the enormous benefits and advantages of this system. It is known that there are especially many rich collective farms among such collective farms.”

First, let us examine more closely what product exchange is. What is its essence? In the USSR, as early as the 1930s (if not before), surplus produce exceeding the contracted amount was “commodified,” that is, exchanged directly for urban-manufactured goods. For example, according to the decree of the USSR Soviet of People’s Commissars dated April 23, 1934, surplus raw cotton delivered beyond the contracted amount was exchanged for grain at double the rate for kolkhozes and one-and-a-half times the rate for individual labor households. Here, there is no monetary mediation, only a direct exchange of raw cotton for grain. That is what product exchange is. And it is a necessary link in the transition to the first phase of communism. If the development of value forms passed through simple, expanded, and universal stages, then the process of overcoming commodity relations moves in the opposite direction. In the USSR, the universal (monetary) form of value was fully developed. **Product exchange represents a transition from the universal form of value to the expanded form of value**, where multiple goods are exchanged for one another without the mediation of a universal equivalent. The transition to the first phase of communism, in turn, entails a shift from the expanded form of value (i.e., product exchange) to the simple form of value, where goods are not exchanged in a complex network but rather one good is directly exchanged for another in each instance. In other words, the simple form of value here refers to the exchange of a

⁶⁷ XIXth Congress Documents, p. 109.

single commodity, labor power, by each worker directly for individual consumer goods (as described by Marx in Critique of the Gotha Program when discussing the first phase of communism). The simple form of value is ultimately abolished with the development of the higher phase of communism.

Thus, the program for developing product exchange was thrown in the trash bin by the Bukharinist G. Malenkov. Instead, it turned out that “trade will remain the principal form of distributing consumer goods among members of socialist society **for a long time to come.**” Such was the stance of this “loyal Stalinist.”

Understanding that the rightist faction was strengthening its social base, the Trotskyists, who were primarily concentrated in party and secretarial posts across union republics, territories, regions, and rayons, decided to seize the initiative from the right. At the September 1953 Plenum of the CPSU Central Committee, firstly, N. Khrushchev was elected First Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, and, secondly, he delivered a speech titled “On Measures for the Further Development of Soviet Agriculture,” in which he essentially copied Malenkov’s (rightist) agricultural program but elaborated on it further.

So, how did the Trotskyists wrest power from the Bukharinists? Precisely by consolidating their class base within the party apparatus and mid-level secretarial positions. Since the party effectively controlled all state and administrative bodies, the Trotskyists emerged as a more influential force than the Bukharinists, whose entire class base was concentrated in the state apparatus and government posts. However, immediately after the counterrevolution, the party organs were not yet strong enough to fully subordinate the executive apparatus (the top echelons of the party apparatus remained under Bukharinist control). We do not intend to cover subsequent events in this work. The events of March–September 1953 outlined here speak for themselves, illustrating the positions of the various contending forces within the petty bourgeoisie itself.

APPENDIX. On the Forms of Petty-Bourgeois Dictatorship

We have examined how the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie was established in the USSR. This dictatorship, just like the dictatorship of the proletariat (Soviet power and people’s democracy) and the dictatorship of the big bourgeoisie (bourgeois democracy, fascism, bonapartism), has its own forms. While much is known about

the latter, virtually nothing has been written about the forms of petty-bourgeois dictatorship. We will fill this gap here.

The petty bourgeoisie, due to its unstable, vacillating position, holds the most diverse and eclectic views. However, all petty bourgeois can generally be divided into two groups based on how they express their interests, as mentioned earlier. One is the leftist group — radical, “revolutionary,” and adventurous in form; the other is the rightist group — conciliatory and tailist in form. These two forms reflect the dual nature of the petty bourgeoisie. The petty bourgeois is simultaneously a laborer and a proprietor. As a laborer, the impoverished petty bourgeois confidently and adventurously fights against their ruin, sometimes aligning with the proletariat for this purpose. But under the system of proletarian dictatorship, this laborer cannot tolerate proletarian rule and attempts to skip necessary stages of development, trying to solve all sorts of problems through reckless, administrative measures. As a proprietor, the impoverished petty bourgeois clings to the remnants of capitalism, hoping to preserve their ownership status by relying on these remnants and seeking to expand their property further. However, the petty bourgeois is both a laborer and a proprietor simultaneously, and these two aspects of their economic position cannot be separated from one another. While in politics, these two aspects gain a degree of independence in the form of left and right opportunism, they ultimately express the same interest (aimed at strengthening capitalism, albeit through different means). These two forms inevitably transform into one another.

So, as already mentioned, in the USSR the united right-Trotskyist bloc seized state power in March 1953. Initially, full authority rested with the rightist faction, but by the end of 1953, the leftist faction had significantly strengthened and taken in its own hands the main levers of power. In my view, the forms of petty-bourgeois dictatorship are determined precisely by which faction of the petty bourgeoisie is in power.

The leftist faction naturally implements its policies through military-administrative (i.e., Trotskyist) measures, which are extremely violent and despotic. Striving to leap immediately into communism (of course, their own petty-bourgeois communism, an abundance for their dear selves), and thus preserve their class dominance, the leftist petty bourgeoisie terrorizes the proletariat, imposing tyranny upon it. This is what we see under the rule of left opportunism — military suppression of workers in Tbilisi, Novocherkassk, Sumgait, etc. This form of petty-bourgeois dictatorship, in my opinion, can be called petty-bourgeois tyranny. It shares several traits with

bonapartism and often employs bonapartist methods of governance, though it is not identical to bonapartism.

The rightist faction implements its policies through spontaneous-capitulationist, tailist measures involving concessions to capitalism. Seeking to preserve its position by developing capitalism (recall Malenkov's reforms strengthening the autonomy of directors and ministers, expanding trade, etc.), the rightist petty bourgeoisie instills proprietary interests into proletarian consciousness, emphasizes material incentives, and corrupts them with its methods. This path, one way or another, involves weakening administrative pressure on both the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie itself while increasing "rights" and "freedoms" of a proprietary nature among the proletariat and especially the petty bourgeoisie. In general, this form of petty-bourgeois dictatorship essentially represents petty-bourgeois democratism. In its fetal, undeveloped form, petty-bourgeois-democratic dictatorship could be observed from March to August 1953.

Just as bourgeois democracy paves the way for fascism, petty-bourgeois democratism in the USSR paved the way for petty-bourgeois tyranny. Once the petty-bourgeois dictatorship in the USSR had suppressed the proletariat, it shifted back from tyrannical rule to democratic rule (by the mid-1960s).

APPENDIX. The Law of Stability in the Development of the Proletarian Revolution

In a number of our works, we have examined the conflict between productive forces and production relations that emerged after the Great Patriotic War. Here, it is necessary to recall the history of the Soviet state. This history was reflected in Lenin's works during his lifetime. I consider it appropriate to cite some interesting excerpts from these works. The first comes from his article "The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government," written in April 1918. There he writes:

"In the war against capital, however, the advance cannot be stopped, and there can be no thought of our abandoning the further expropriation of capital. What we are discussing is the shifting of the centre of gravity of our economic and political work. Up to now **measures for the direct expropriation of the expropriators** were in the forefront. Now the **organization of accounting and control in those enterprises in which the capitalists have already been expropriated**, and in all other enterprises, advances to the forefront. If we decided to continue to expropriate capital at the same

rate at which we have been doing it up to now, we should **certainly suffer defeat**, because our work of organizing proletarian accounting and control has obviously — obviously to every thinking person — **fallen behind** the work of directly ‘expropriating the expropriators.’ If we now concentrate all our efforts on the organization of accounting and control, we shall be able to solve this problem, we shall be able to make up for lost time, we shall completely win our ‘campaign’ against capital.”⁶⁸

The second quote refers to Lenin’s speech at the VIIth Moscow Gubernial Party Conference in October 1921:

“If you recall the declarations, official and unofficial, which our Party made in late 1917 and early 1918, you will see that even at that time we were aware that the revolution, the struggle, might proceed either by a relatively short road, or by a very long and difficult road. But in estimating the prospects of development we in most cases — I can scarcely recall an exception — started out with the assumption — perhaps not always openly expressed but always tacitly taken for granted — that we would be **able to proceed straight away with socialist construction...**

At that time — March or April 1918 — in discussing our tasks, we began to consider the prospect of passing from methods of gradual transition to such modes of operation as a struggle mainly for the expropriation of the expropriators, and this, in the main, characterized the first months of the revolution — the end of 1917 and the beginning of 1918. Even at that time we were obliged to say that **our organization of accounting and control lagged considerably behind our work and activities in connection with the expropriation of the expropriators. That meant we had expropriated more than we could take account of, control, manage, etc.,** and thus the question was raised of transferring our activities from the task of expropriating, of smashing the power of the exploiters and expropriators, to that of organizing accounting and control, to the, so to speak, prosaic tasks of actual economic development. Even at that time we had to retreat on a number of points.”⁶⁹

⁶⁸ V.I. Lenin. The Immediate Tasks of the Soviet Government. The New Phase of the Struggle Against the Bourgeoisie.

⁶⁹ V.I. Lenin. Seventh Moscow Gubernia Conference of the Russian Communist Party. October 29–31, 1921.

In short, the idea expressed here is the following: in the initial period of War Communism, the state expropriated so much capital that it was unable to manage all of it. The pace of capital expropriation outstripped the pace of organizing the management of those capital assets by the proletariat. Accordingly, the Bolsheviks slowed the pace of expropriation, and in some cases even halted it, in order to at least align the available administrative personnel with the capital that needed to be managed.

In other words, it became necessary to shrink the state sector of the economy or to lease out some assets to foreign capitalists so that the remaining state-owned capital could be effectively governed. Otherwise, a conflict would have emerged between the productive forces and the relations of production, which would have manifested in a counterrevolutionary coup.

In order to manage the productive forces, the proletariat must be capable of managing them consciously and in a proletarian manner. If the number of proletarians (conscious ones, i.e., communists) is too small to manage the productive forces already held in proletarian ownership, then a conflict arises between the “organization of accounting and control” and these productive forces.

To the extent that new proletarian, communist cadres grew, so too did the pace of nationalization of the means of production. The new generations of communists who emerged in the 1930s were successfully able to control all the productive forces in the country in accordance with their goals.

After the Great Patriotic War, when the number of communists (not by party membership, but by conviction) dropped significantly, and the number of active grassroots organizers also decreased, the same problem reappeared. But now under different conditions — all productive forces were now either in state or partly in cooperative ownership. The pace of postwar recovery and general growth of the productive forces once again outpaced the rate at which communists were being reproduced, that is, the pace at which proletarian accounting and control over those forces was being organized. Accordingly, the management of these productive forces was spontaneously and massively assumed by petty-bourgeois and capitalist elements. How could this problem have been solved? A second reduction of the state sector and the transfer of productive forces to private individuals was already impossible. In my opinion, the communists should not have dissolved the State Defense Committee (GKO) in 1945. During the war, all democratic procedures and norms were curtailed, and all party and state personnel were strictly subordinate to

the GKO. The GKO should have been retained because intra-party democracy only facilitated the advancement of the bourgeoisie. By retaining the GKO, in addition to the task of restoring the national economy, it would have been immediately necessary to initiate party purges and intensively educate a new generation of Bolshevik cadres. Only after building up the necessary personnel could the GKO have been dissolved and democratic procedures reinstated in state and party institutions. In one instance (the 1920s), the Bolsheviks were able to avoid a conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production. In the second case (the late 1940s), they failed — although in my view, the opportunity existed.

By examining these two essentially similar cases (albeit under different conditions — in the 1920s and late 1940s), we can formulate a **general law**. If the pace of expansion and development of the productive forces outstrips the pace of “organization of accounting and control,” the growth rate of proletarian cadres, then the proletariat will suffer defeat, a conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production becomes inevitable. To prevent the contradiction between production forces and production relations from turning into a conflict, the growth rate of communist cadres must take precedence over the growth rate of the productive forces. If such a priority exists, the proletarian revolution will develop steadily. Any objective law, if studied and understood, can be consciously applied. This also applies to the law stated above. Since we have come to understand this law, we derive from it the methods of application: *the fewer communist cadres there are, the greater the need for centralism, and conversely, the more there are, the greater the emphasis on democratization.*

In addition to all this, Lenin developed the Marxist theory of a revolutionary situation. According to Lenin, a revolutionary situation is defined by the following features:

“(1) When it is impossible for the ruling classes to maintain their rule without any change; when there is a crisis, in one form or another, among the ‘upper classes,’ a crisis in the policy of the ruling class, leading to a fissure through which the discontent and indignation of the oppressed classes burst forth. For a revolution to take place, it is usually insufficient for ‘the lower classes not to want’ to live in the old way; it is also necessary that ‘the upper classes should be unable’ to live in the old way; (2) when the suffering and want of the oppressed classes have grown more acute than usual; (3) when, as a consequence of the above causes, there is a considerable increase in the activity of the masses, who uncomplainingly allow

themselves to be robbed in ‘peace time,’ but, in turbulent times, are drawn both by all the circumstances of the crisis and by the ‘upper classes’ themselves into independent historical action.

Without these objective changes, which are independent of the will, not only of individual groups and parties but even of individual classes, a revolution, as a general rule, is impossible. The totality of all these objective changes is called a revolutionary situation.”⁷⁰

However, in Marxist literature there is generally no concept of a counterrevolutionary situation. I will fill this gap here. From everything we have studied about counterrevolution, the following signs of a counterrevolutionary situation can be identified:

1. the proletariat’s inability to maintain its control over the state, the inability to “organize accounting and control” over all nationalized productive forces and the entire social structure in general (a crisis of proletarian accounting and control);
2. the spontaneous placement of petty-bourgeois forces in various administrative positions;
3. a significant increase, for the above reasons, in the activity of petty-bourgeois masses.

Without these factors, a petty-bourgeois counterrevolution in a proletarian country is impossible. But these factors only indicate the possibility of counterrevolution, not yet its actuality. Just as not every revolutionary situation leads to the victory of the revolution, not every counterrevolutionary situation leads to the victory of the counterrevolution. For the counterrevolution to triumph, a subjective factor is also needed — a counterrevolutionary party that uses the existing counterrevolutionary situation to achieve victory. It must be said that the conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production does not in itself signify the victory of the counterrevolution. This conflict is merely another name for a counterrevolutionary situation.

⁷⁰ V.I. Lenin. The Collapse of the Second International.

Let me now briefly formulate the law. The law of stable development of the proletarian revolution consists in the fact that the ratio between the growth rates of communist cadres and the development rates of the productive forces plays a decisive role in the construction of proletarian socialism. If the growth rate of communist cadres outpaces the development of the productive forces, the proletarian revolution will develop stably, if rather the opposite is true, a counterrevolutionary situation is inevitable. If the proletariat has few of its own educated cadres, it must subordinate democracy to centralism, if rather it has many, then on the contrary — it must subordinate centralism to democracy.

9. How Can Future Proletarian Dictatorships Prevent Counterrevolution?

Having analyzed the entire course of revolution and counterrevolution in the USSR, it is now necessary to address the question: how can communists and the working class, under the dictatorship of the proletariat, prevent the success of a counterrevolution in the future? From our analysis, the following can be drawn:

First, it is essential to protect the ruling proletarian party from uncontrolled growth. This means that when admitting new members to the party, every individual must be thoroughly vetted in practice — tested for proletarian class commitment and Marxist literacy. Since the party of the working class is a party guided by science, it must require those entering it to know the science and be able to apply it in practice. Without understanding the laws governing the development of society and the construction of socialism and communism, the party will be unable to move forward as a unified force toward the building of socialism.

Second, it is critical to prevent the substitution of Soviet and economic organs by party organs, to strengthen the guiding, political role of the party, and to prevent this role from degenerating into an administrative function. The party must not resolve state and economic issues directly, but only through the Soviets.

Third, diverse forms of control by the working masses over executive officials must be developed and strengthened, about which Lenin wrote: “The more resolutely we now have to stand for a ruthlessly firm government, for the dictatorship of individuals in definite processes of work, in definite aspects of purely executive functions, the more varied must be the forms and methods of control from below.” This includes trade unions, which must be genuine unions defending workers’ interests and training workers to govern the state. It also includes Soviet sections, which involve the working masses in direct oversight of the executive apparatus.

In addition to representative democracy, which, in essence, is bourgeois in nature and inevitably includes an executive apparatus and is necessary at a certain stage of the revolution, direct democracy, i.e., proletarian democracy, must be developed, where workers participate in governing the state not through representatives but directly. Soviet sections, trade unions, workers’-peasants’ inspectorates, etc., serve precisely this function.

I believe it is necessary to explain here how Soviet sections operated in the 1930s. In 1934, the following list of Soviet sections was approved:

“a) For city and regional Soviets:

1) Industrial, 2) Public utilities), 3) Financial, 4) Public education, 5) Healthcare, 6) Public catering, 7) Trade and cooperatives, 8) Suburban agriculture, 9) Transport, 10) Communications, 11) Revolutionary legality, 12) Defense;

b) For rural Soviets:

1) Crop farming, 2) Animal husbandry, 3) Cultural, 4) Public amenities, 5) Financial, 6) Trade and procurement, 7) Roads and communications, 8) Revolutionary legality, 9) Defense.”

For example, the Public Education sections monitored the activities of the Department of Public Education, supervised the work of schools, kindergartens, etc. All other sections functioned in the same manner. Every section, except one, participated in overseeing various departments of the Soviet. That exception was the Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection (RKI) section, which took active part in the work of the Soviet departments themselves (of course, RKI sections existed until 1934, when the People’s Commissariat of RKI was renamed the Commission of Soviet Control under the Soviet of People’s Commissars of the USSR).

In the Sokolniki Regional Soviet of Moscow, “members of the RKI section carried out almost all the work of investigating complaints received by the Complaint Bureau of the Regional Workers’ and Peasants’ Inspection. Of 1,838 cases that passed through the RKI over a 20-month period (January 1927–October 1928), 1,400 were investigated solely by members of the RKI section.”

At the head of each Soviet section stood a Section Bureau, elected at general meetings of the section’s members (i.e., at Plenums), which were convened monthly in rotating shifts so that every single section member could participate. Section Bureaus themselves met 2–4 times a month, depending on the working conditions, and discussed both ongoing and planned work. Section chairpersons were either Soviet deputies or workers “straight from the shop floor.”

As an example of section activity, we can look at the Sokolniki Regional Soviet in Moscow, and specifically the Housing Section and the RKI Section.

“Housing Section.

Supervision over the proper distribution of housing space in the Regional Association for the Management of Housing Property (ROUNI), the struggle against red tape and bureaucratism in its apparatus, and the inspection of the activities of the boards and audit commissions of housing cooperatives — these constitute the main work carried out by the housing section of the regional council.

In the span of two years, the section's members conducted about 400 audits of the economic activities of building administrations, uncovering embezzlements amounting to 20,000 rubles.

The members also carried out 1,200 inspections based on applications to ROUNI to determine the need for housing space.

The control commission created under the section studied the work of the ROUNI apparatus and put forward a number of valuable proposals. As a result of the commission's work, three employees in the ROUNI apparatus were eliminated, which reduced expenditures by 4,000 rubles per year.

Questions of housing construction also occupied an important place in the work of the housing section. Members of the section were assigned to all housing-construction cooperatives in the rayon, and they uncovered a number of irregularities in construction: at a Mosstroy construction site, expensive construction machinery lay unused like dead weight (three shaft hoists, two concrete mixers, and a crane); at the construction of houses for the workers of 'Krasny Bogatyr,'⁷¹ there were cases of using freshly slaked lime, which led to damage to the masonry.

There are still many shortcomings in our housing economy, in the work of ROUNI and in the activities of the building administrations.

Members of the housing section will have to study more strictly and attentively and monitor the work of our housing authorities."

"RKI Section.

The struggle with bureaucratism and abuses within our apparatus, on all kinds of red tape, inattentive or rude treatment towards section's members workers' complaints, investigations based on notes by worker-correspondents — this is what

⁷¹ Translator's Note: Red Bogatyr, a Moscow factory.

the activities of the members of the RKI section consisted of. As we have already indicated, almost all the work of investigating the numerous complaints received by the Regional Workers' and Peasants' Inspection is carried out by members of the section.

A number of bureaucrats and genuine wreckers in our Soviet construction were exposed, removed from their posts, and brought to trial solely thanks to the vigilance and clarity of the work of the RKI section.

Among the concrete achievements of this section we may note the following:

Here are a few concrete achievements of this section.

In the Model Artel of the Metkompromsoyuz, a certain Timofeyev surrounded himself with relatives, selected an obedient audit commission, appointed his journalist brother as a highly qualified specialist with a large salary, although he had no understanding of metals, and placed his barely literate sister in the artel as a bookkeeper with a salary of 210 rubles a month.

For professional criticism, this bureaucrat-wrecker dismissed nine workers, beat Komsomol members, and so on. All this was revealed thanks to the thorough investigation conducted by the RKI section. By decision of the section, the dismissed workers were reinstated, Timofeyev was removed from his post and brought to trial, and the head of the organizational department of Metkompromsoyuz was reprimanded for poor supervision of the cooperative and the question of his removal from office was raised.

Another case was uncovered by members of the RKI section in the store of the Leningrad Wallpaper Trust on Kuznetsky Bridge. Here two former factory owners, deprived of voting rights, had turned the state store into a source of personal enrichment, adding markups on goods from 60 to 270 percent; the most popular goods were supplied to private traders on credit, and so on. As a result of the investigation by the members of the section, both factory owners were dismissed from their posts, and one of them was sentenced to two years. A mass inspection of wall newspapers helped uncover a number of cases in which the administration treated the proposals of workers and employees with neglect.

Many directors treated manifestations of workers' self-criticism in a bureaucratic manner, leaving a number of substantive notes by worker-correspondents unanswered. The results of the investigation conducted by the section were discussed

at the presidium of the Regional Control Commission. Appropriate measures were adopted to eliminate the noted shortcomings. An inspection of complaint books showed that 65 percent of them were kept by shop managers and were not always issued to consumers.

There were cases when the intervention of the police was required in order to obtain the book. The boards and audit commissions of cooperatives paid insufficient attention to the complaints of working people, limiting themselves to formal replies. All the materials of the investigation in the Sokolniki rayon, together with materials from other rayons of Moscow, were discussed at the collegium of the Moscow Workers' and Peasants' Inspection. At present the procedure for keeping the books has been changed: the books are kept at the cash desks of shops and are issued without the presentation of any documents, upon the first request of the consumer. The achievements in the work of the RKI section are quite significant.

Many abuses in the institutions and enterprises of the rayon have been eliminated thanks to the activities of this militant detachment of workers' and peasants' control. But there is still one major shortcoming in the work of the section — the absence of systematic verification of the implementation and actual enforcement of the resolutions both of the Regional RKI and of the section itself.

It is necessary that in the future not a single resolution, not a single decision of the Workers' and Peasants' Inspection remain without action. Every member of the RKI section must ensure that for the investigation entrusted to him not only is a resolution adopted, but that he also verifies on the spot how this very resolution of the RKI or the section has been carried out in practice.”

Such participation of workers in the sections, that is, constant control on their part over institutions and enterprises, gave them an immensely rich experience in managing the state.

Taking this historical experience into account, the future Soviet state must be built on these same principles, actively developing the sections of the Soviets as a tool for the practical education of workers in governance, alongside the Proletarian Inspections (which must have their own sections in every Soviet) and worker patronage.

At the same time, it is necessary to vigorously promote the self-initiated activist work of Soviet, economic, party, and trade union organizations, since only they serve as a support for the leading proletarian core in the construction of socialism.

Fourth, the proletariat must subordinate all tactical questions to strategic ones, and must not sacrifice strategic class interests for the sake of momentary gains. During the Great Patriotic War, a heroization of outstanding pre-revolutionary figures began, with a special emphasis on the role of the Russian people, and relaxations toward the church were introduced. This was out of necessity. But the greatest mistake was that after the war, all these elements of supraclass (petty-bourgeois) patriotism were not rolled back, but further intensified.

At the same time, the class character of processes taking place in society was forgotten, and became subordinated to supraclass considerations. The control over the spiritual relations of society and its spiritual production is a key duty of the vanguard of the proletariat — in order to provide class education for the proletarians and semi-proletarians.

The task of communists today is to develop Marxist theory, to research the historical experience of the working class and the communists, to study contemporary economics and politics, and thereby be the vanguard of theoretical class struggle. This is precisely the work undertaken by our organization — Workers' Paradigm, which is unified by its cells around our press organ, "Marxist Science." Only from the theoretical class struggle of communists and its merging with the economic class struggle of workers does a genuine proletarian party develop, that is, political struggle is born.

Conclusion

The proletarian revolution in our country lasted from November 7, 1917, to March 5, 1953. This revolution was carried out by the proletariat together with the large masses of the petty bourgeoisie. Whenever any group of the petty bourgeoisie helped the proletariat push the revolution forward, but then could no longer keep up with it, the proletariat eliminated that group. Thus, the Trotskyist faction helped advance the revolution only at its earliest stage, when the proletariat, in addition to its communist goals, was still resolving some of the tasks of the bourgeois-democratic revolution. After the Trotskyists came the Bukharinist opposition, which wanted to follow the path of private capitalist development, but was also politically destroyed by the proletariat. However, even though the Trotskyists and Bukharinists were destroyed politically, the economic foundations that produced them continued to exist and reproduce them in society. One way or another, the proletariat was strong, and its revolution was on the rise until June 22, 1941. On that day began the greatest battle in history between the proletarian revolution and the bourgeois counterrevolution, the outcome of which was in favor of the former. However, after defeating the external counterrevolution, the proletariat proved weak against the internal one.

The reverse process began in 1945, when petty-bourgeois groups started actively fighting for power, step by step taking power positions away from the proletariat. The class struggle between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie reached its peak in October 1952. With its last strength, the proletariat pushed through its agenda at the XIXth Party Congress, which immediately after the congress ended, was rendered null. The proletarian group acted as an appendage of the right-opportunist opposition, even though it had under its control the highest legislative body — the Supreme Soviet. In turn, the right opposition gradually stripped the proletariat of its power, putting a full stop to this process on March 5, 1953. The downward line of the proletarian revolution was completed, for the revolution itself was interrupted. On March 15, the proletariat itself legalized the state coup of the right opposition. The latter became alarmed by the extreme activity of one of its own representatives — L. Beria — and with the support of the Trotskyist faction, eliminated him. Step by step, the Bukharinists handed control of the party apparatus over to the Trotskyists. With the support of mid-level party secretaries and the army elite, the Trotskyists ousted the Bukharinists. This process dragged on from September 1953 to June 1957, when the anti-party group, consisting of communists and Bukharinists, was expelled from the party.

By his class affiliation, N. Khrushchev, who led the Trotskyist faction, was not even a petty bourgeois, but a lumpen-proletarian. He relied on declassed workers, whom the army had turned into obedient noddies, and on army officers with lumpen habits. He picked up the postwar grassroots de-Stalinization and completed this process with the official denunciation of the “cult of personality.” He was merely an expression of the interests of his class, just as Trump or Biden are expressions of theirs today. Blaming everything on him, but not on the class whose interests he represented — that is the methodology of today’s left.

The Bukharinist opposition (which was the strongest in the postwar period) opposed proletarian rule but handed power to the lumpen-proletariat led by Nikita Khrushchev. It turned the proletarian Supreme Soviet into a fiction, Khrushchev turned its Soviet of Ministers into a fiction. It fought against the cult of personality but got in return the cult of unaccountability⁷² (Khrushchev). It fought for the rights of directors and ministers but got in return their total powerlessness. It fought for collective leadership, and Khrushchev destroyed that collectivity at the first opportunity.

The dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie is the most unreliable form of power among all existing ones. It is able to solve current problems only haphazardly and is doomed to complete failure in the long term. And here is why. All managers hired by a big bourgeois to run his enterprise are accountable to him and can be fired for poor performance that fails to secure him profits. All managers (officials) hired by a big-bourgeois state are accountable to that state (as in Russia or Belarus) or to the bourgeois groups that lobbied them (as in the USA or UK). For failing to fulfill their duties in securing profits (or for hindering this), they too are dismissed from their posts. Under the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, nothing of the sort exists. Not a single high-level manager bears any accountability. And none did in the USSR. A.B. Razlatsky aptly described this condition:

“If work deteriorates in one section for a capitalist, the administrator responsible for that section will be replaced. If work deteriorates in many sections at once — the owner will fire the top administrator. He will select another — a better one. Likewise with us. If things are bad in some section — the administrator can be replaced. If

⁷² Translator’s Note: Play on words, as the Russian equivalent for “unaccountability” (obezlichennosti) is closer in form to the English word “impersonality.”

there is a breakdown in many sections, the top administration should be changed... And here the proletariat — the owner, the hegemon — reaches an impasse. It has the right to replace the administration. But how to exercise this right? Such a right exists, but this right is a fiction. The same kind of fiction as many bourgeois rights and freedoms. The right turns out to be phony! It is a fiction because there is no one to carry out such a replacement! Not that there are no candidates at all — there are. But to find a suitable candidate, one must hear him out, one must check him, one must evaluate him. So where can he speak out so that every worker, the entire working class, can hear him? That's how it turns out that our chain lacks one most crucial link. A link is missing, and **the top administrator feels no responsibility towards the proletariat**. He has no time and no need to think about work, he does not fear the owner, but fears something else entirely: lest his subordinates somehow manage to unseat him. And the top administrator spends his strength on protecting himself from this. And he does not demand work from his subordinates — even the appearance of work satisfies him. But he demands support, demands guarantees of his own safety. For him, those subordinates are good who will not strive for his post, will not want to interfere in his affairs. And this serves as the criterion for selection. For those lower down — the same concerns. And they also need to ensure that the superior has no cause for dissatisfaction. Therefore, the appearance of work must be good, and the behavior — loyal... And this goes through the entire chain from top to bottom. **And no one cares about the actual work. Production successes are not the goal here. They are merely a pretext to climb higher, to reach a juicier piece.** And this pretext is not the only one, not even the main one. A skillful administrator can wreck the enterprise so that others will answer for it, while he gets promoted.”⁷³

As a result, the dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie is “not aimed at boosting production, at raising its efficiency. Due to circumstances, it... has largely lost its original purpose, has turned **into an organized arena for the division of surplus value, an arena of petty-bourgeois struggle for one's personal share of the wealth**

⁷³ A.B. Razlatsky. “Who Answers?”. 1977 (I will note in parentheses that although A. Razlatsky came close to defining the state system in the USSR as a dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, he failed to do so and instead referred to it as a new feudalism. Indeed, the tyranny of the petty bourgeoisie in the USSR, in its external appearance, does resemble feudalism in certain aspects. Nevertheless, it was precisely a dictatorship of the petty bourgeoisie, which had seized the large capitalist factory called “the USSR” and, due to its shopkeeper mentality, managed to destroy, dismantle, and sell off that factory.).

expropriated from the product produced by the proletariat. And the management of production, from the main, target factor for the entire system, has turned into an **indirect factor, merely due to formal (for the administration) reasons, and one that influences the determination of the share of loot.** Hence the wretchedness of our production successes.”

Recently, I came across the media resource “Kultprosvet.” Three years ago, they released a video titled “Socialist Realism and Counterrevolution,” in which the author, analyzing the art of the prewar and postwar periods, **came to conclusions very similar to those I reached in my own works.** Just the scientific study of art led this person to understand: (1) that prewar art was fully proletarian; (2) that during the war, there was a retreat from proletarian art due to the focus on civilians remaining in the rear; (3) that after the war, fewer and fewer works in the style of socialist realism were produced, and more and more in the genre of melodrama. This allowed the author to interpret the postwar events as a counterrevolution.

APPENDIX. Class Struggle in Postwar USSR (1945–1952)

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Leftists often view Stalin as some kind of all-powerful tsar who could single-handedly decide any issues and impose his will on the entire country. However, this is a myth that is opposed to real empirical history and historical materialism.

Stalin, of course, had weight and influence in the leadership of the Bolshevik Party and, as Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, could influence the decrees and orders of the Soviet of Ministers. However, the entire Bolshevik Party and the entire state apparatus of the USSR were built on the principle of democratic centralism. Therefore, Stalin had to obey the decisions of those authorities in which he was a member.

We know that in the postwar period the bourgeoisie within the party grew stronger due to the death of the bulk of communists in the war. The question arises: If the bourgeoisie constituted the majority, then did the democratically adopted decisions within the party express the interests of the bourgeoisie? This is partly true. Speaking about his conspiratorial group, Khrushchev said the following at the XXth Congress of the CPSU:

“The XXth Congress of the Party and the entire policy of the Central Committee since Stalin’s death clearly prove that there was in being a Leninist core of leaders within the Central Committee, who had a correct understanding of the pressing requirements in the spheres of home and foreign policy. **It cannot be said that there was no opposition to the negative phenomena associated with the cult of the individual which hindered the advance of Socialism. Moreover, there were certain periods, as for example during the war, when the unilateral acts of Stalin were sharply restricted,** when the negative consequences of lawlessness, of arbitrary rule, etc., were materially weakened.”⁷⁴

Khrushchev cited the war years as an example of a certain period. However, to an even greater extent, “the unilateral acts of Stalin” (in fact — the position of the proletarian part of the party) were sharply limited in the postwar period. Stalin,

⁷⁴ On Overcoming the Cult of the Individual and Its Consequences: A Resolution of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. 30 June 1956.

Zhdanov, Kaganovich and other communists, despite a weaker social base within the party, tried to influence the decisions of the highest party authorities. And sometimes they succeeded. Often, the petty-bourgeois elements turned out to be stronger and “democratically” carried out decisions that were advantageous to them.

Since Stalin weakened physically in the postwar period and was often treated, the bourgeois part of the party won for itself (democratically, of course) the opportunity to sign under Stalin’s name (as evidenced by documents). The active bourgeois counterrevolutionary A. Mikoyan explained this moment in his memoirs (wanting to denigrate Stalin, he misspoke a little):

“All my hopes for the democratization of the regime were gradually fading away. Even within the party leadership, the norms correctly established during the war were violated. Although the comradely atmosphere of work in the leadership in no way diminished Stalin’s role. On the contrary, in almost all cases, we **attributed our own proposals, formalized under Stalin’s signature**, entirely to Stalin, without declaring that the author was not Stalin but another comrade.”⁷⁵

In general — this is very favorable soil for preparing a bourgeois counterrevolution. Let us examine this “soil” in our article.

1. Class Struggle Within the Party

If we talk about the intra-party class struggle in the USSR after the war, we can identify two main problems of this struggle.

Firstly, this is a question of the relationship between party and Soviet organs, the regulation of this relationship and the associated changes in the party apparatus.

Secondly, this is the problem of the balance of power within the party apparatus, the problem of the influence of opposing class forces on the adoption of party decisions.

⁷⁵ A. Mikoyan. *So It Was*. Russian edition.

1. The Question of the Relationship Between Party and Soviet Organs, the Regulation of This Relationship and the Associated Changes in the Party Apparatus

If we talk about the first problem, we should start with the decisions of the XVIIIth Party Congress (1939). As is known, from 1934 to 1939, the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had integrated production-industry departments, created “... *to perform the practical work involved in carrying out Party resolutions and decisions (and to keep a check on the way they are fulfilled by Soviet bodies, business organizations and the lower Party organizations) [...] in the regional committees, territorial committees, Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the national republics, and the Central Committee of the CPSU(b).*”⁷⁶ The XVIIIth Party Congress decided that such a system of organizing the party apparatus was insufficient and **abolished the production-industry departments** (with the exception of the agricultural department). The basis for this decision were two revealed facts: (1) the presence of production-industry departments made it difficult to move party cadres from one industry to another, scattered cadres between different departments and did not allow for the efficient use of available party cadres; (2) the presence of production-industry departments led to the fact that they allowed the substitution of economic bodies, competed with them, created an atmosphere of unaccountability and irresponsibility in work. In other words, if in the whole society in the mid-1930s the functional system was formally destroyed and a system of personal responsibility was introduced, then in fact the functional system was preserved due to the parallelism of party and economic bodies.

At the XIth Party Congress (1922), V.I. Lenin correctly emphasized:

“... But everybody has just said, everybody has agreed, and we have complete unanimity on the point (and this is very important, for action depends upon this unity) that the Party machinery must be **separated** from the Soviet government machinery. It is terribly difficult to do this; **we lack the men!**...”

The shortage of Bolshevik personnel led to the same people being promoted to work in the party and Soviet apparatuses. The two apparatuses were merged into one, and the task of demarcation began to be solved only at the end of the 1930s, when a

⁷⁶ The XVIIIth Congress of CPSU, pp. 451–452.

whole generation of Bolshevik party and Soviet personnel grew up, in connection with which it was decided to abolish the production and industry departments. Keeping them meant allowing the substitution of Soviet-economic organs by party ones, slowing down the process of involving workers in *“independent participation in the administration of the state.”*

What does it mean to separate the party and Soviet apparatuses? After all, in the Soviets at all levels, the majority of elected deputies are party members who are obliged to implement the party line through these Soviets. But! It is one thing when the party line is implemented **through Soviet organs**, through Bolshevik deputies elected to them by workers, **authorized by them** to implement this line. But it is another thing when party organs and structures **directly** decide Soviet-economic issues, without having the authority to do so, without being authorized by workers, without bearing responsibility and accountability to voters. This is what it means to replace Soviet-economic organs with party organs, which not only leads to a lack of control by the lower classes, but also leads to the above-mentioned competition between party and Soviet organs, a functional system (unaccountability) and irresponsibility. Of course, it was in the interests of the working class to separate the two apparatuses, to preserve the accountability and controllability of party deputies through Soviet organs. This applies, first of all, to the Soviet of People’s Commissars (Soviet of Ministers) of the USSR — the highest executive body of power in the country. The Soviet of People’s Commissars of the USSR was formed by the Supreme Soviet of the USSR at its session and was accountable and responsible to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, and in the period between its sessions — to the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR.

What happens to the organizational structure of the party after the war? In 1946, the production-industry departments were finally liquidated (the above-mentioned agricultural department remained in the party, as well as the transport department created in 1942). Here it should be noted that the active conductor of this proletarian policy was A.A. Zhdanov — it was he who spoke at the XVIIIth Party Congress with a proposal to liquidate them. As is known, Zhdanov fell ill in July 1948 and died on August 31. In the same month of **July 1948**, the production-industry departments of the party were restored. Here either (1) the decision reflected the state of affairs in the party, the strengthening of the position of the bourgeoisie in it, or (2) the decision was necessary (i.e., was in the interests of the proletariat) due to the task of restoring the national economy that was at that time. The second option can be dismissed immediately, because **if** the presence of production-industry structures

helps restore the national economy, then they would have been restored immediately after the war (for example, at the 1946 Plenum), and after the war, as we know, on the contrary, the remaining industry departments were abolished. If we reason factually, then how can departments that create parallelism and lead to unaccountability help restore the national economy? In no way. Therefore, this restoration was precisely of a bourgeois nature, reflecting the **strengthening of the bourgeoisie** in the party apparatus (the preliminary basis for this conclusion is our study of the intra-party counterrevolution in the CPSU). We cannot yet go into this process in depth here, so we will leave this conclusion in general terms for now. We will reveal this conclusion later.

According to our research, many decisions were made at the XIXth Party Congress that reflected the interests of the proletariat within the party. In our opinion (confirmed by facts), this congress was an attempt by the proletarian part of the party (which was then in the minority) **to purge the party and strengthen its position.**

There is a deeply erroneous misconception that the liquidation of the Politburo of the Central Committee at the XIXth Congress (which had previously been created for political work) and the creation of the Presidium of the Central Committee in its place (created to direct the work of the Central Committee in between its Plenums) supposedly meant the removal of the party from state power. Supporters of this theory say that from that moment on the Bolshevik Party ceased to be the ruling party. However, this does not correspond to reality, because the following lines were preserved in the party charter: ***“The Central Committee guides the work of the central Soviet and public organizations through the Party groups within them.”***⁷⁷ This corresponded to the role assigned to the party in the country’s Constitution:

“... the most active and politically most conscious citizens in the ranks of the working class and other sections of the working people unite in the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (Bolsheviks), which is the vanguard of the working people in their struggle to strengthen and develop the socialist system and is the **leading core of all organizations of the working people, both public and state**” (Article 126).

⁷⁷ Rules of the CPSU, p. 17.

What did the fact of the liquidation of the Politburo and the creation of the Presidium in its place mean? Since the Politburo consisted mainly of bourgeois members at the time of the XIXth Party Congress, it lost its political functions and became, accordingly, the Presidium without political functions. The decision is logical — it was an attempt by the proletarian part of the party **to prevent the political influence of the strengthened bourgeoisie on state power and state administration**. After all, the Politburo decided on matters directly related to the composition of the Government, changes in this composition, etc.

It is precisely with this that the haste of the bourgeoisie to create, immediately after the congress at the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU on October 16, 1952, the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU with the same, i.e., with political functions, which the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) had. We call the events of October 1952 the October intra-party counterrevolution in the CPSU.

Thus, we can state the following facts related to the problem of the relationship between party and Soviet organs.

In **1946**, a proletarian decision was made to finally liquidate the production-industry departments in the party apparatus.

In **1948**, this reform was rolled back and a bourgeois decision was made to restore the production and industry departments.

At the party congress in **1952**, the bourgeois political organ of the Central Committee, the Politburo, was liquidated.

A few days after the end of the congress in the same **year of 1952**, the bourgeois political organ of the Central Committee was restored under the new name of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU.

2. The Problem of the Balance of Power Within the Party Apparatus, the Problem of the Influence of Opposing Class Forces on the Adoption of Party Decisions

If we talk about the alignment of class forces in the postwar USSR within the party, then first it is worth recalling our previous study, which provides the class composition of the Politburo and other bodies in the postwar period, as a reflection of the balance of class forces in the Central Committee of the party and in the party as a whole. Here we will examine this balance in more depth.

At the March 1946 Plenum of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), the Politburo membership was expanded with the bourgeois L. Beria and G. Malenkov. Before that, Stalin, Molotov, Kalinin, Andreyev, Zhdanov, Kaganovich, Voroshilov, Mikoyan, and Khrushchev had been members of the Politburo. Bulganin and Kosygin were elected candidates for membership in the Politburo. In addition to them, Shvernik and Voznesensky had already been candidates⁷⁸. As we can see, the ratio of the proletariat to the bourgeoisie in the Politburo at that time was 55% to 45%.

The Secretariat of the Central Committee formed at the March Plenum consisted of Stalin, Zhdanov, Malenkov, A.A. Kuznetsov and G.M. Popov. Four structures remained in the apparatus of the Central Committee — the Personnel Department, headed by A.A. Kuznetsov, the Propaganda and Agitation Department, headed by A.A. Zhdanov, the Organizational-Instructional Department, headed by M.A. Shamberg and the Foreign Policy Department, headed by M.A. Suslov. And on April 13, 1946, by a resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee, responsibilities were distributed between the secretaries of the Central Committee, and the work schedule of the Secretariat of the Central Committee and the Organizational Bureau of the Central Committee was approved. We consider it necessary to cite part of the resolution:

“1. To approve the following distribution of duties between the Secretaries of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Comrades G.M. Malenkov, A.A. Zhdanov, A.A. Kuznetsov, and G.M. Popov:

- a. Comrade G.M. Malenkov — matters of leadership of the work of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics; preparation of matters for the Orgburo and chairmanship of the latter’s meetings;
- b. Comrade A.A. Zhdanov — leadership of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the work of party and Soviet organizations in the area of propaganda and agitation (press, publishing, cinema, radio, TASS, art, oral propaganda and agitation); leadership of the Foreign Policy Department;

⁷⁸ RGANI. F. 2. O. 1. D. 6. L. 7.

- c. Comrade A.A. Kuznetsov — leadership of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and work in the area of distribution of personnel in party, Soviet, and economic bodies; preparation of matters for the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and chairmanship of the latter's meetings; issues of managing the work of regional party committees of regions included in the RSFSR. To approve the Secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), Comrade A.A. Kuznetsov, as Head of the Personnel Department of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks);
- d. Comrade G.M. Popov — participates in the work of the Secretariat and the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), without bearing special responsibilities for the Central Committee, due to his busyness with managing the Moscow Party Organization and the Moscow Soviet.

2. To assign to the Orgburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the responsibility of checking the work of regional committees, territorial committees, and the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, hearing their reports, and taking the necessary measures to improve the work of local party organizations.

3. To assign to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) the responsibility of distributing leading party, Soviet, and economic personnel.”⁷⁹

Let us immediately mention the work of A.A. Zhdanov as head of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee. This work was consistently proletarian, which is confirmed by the large-scale campaigns for the affirmation of the proletarian line in the field of art (literature, theater, cinema, music, etc.), biology, history of philosophy, etc. Thanks to these campaigns, the proletarian part of the party, despite its small numbers, was able to keep the entire area of spiritual relations of the USSR under its control. But more important for party work were political relations and their control (i.e., the alignment of class forces). And these relations within the party,

⁷⁹ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1057. L. 2–3.

in accordance with the decisions of the March plenum of the Central Committee and the April resolution of the Politburo of the Central Committee, were regulated by G.M. Malenkov and A.A. Kuznetsov. The most important work of the party apparatus on the distribution of leading party, Soviet and economic personnel ended up in the hands of the bourgeois counterrevolutionary, the fascist degenerate A.A. Kuznetsov.

Even bourgeois historians have research that correctly reveals the essence of the Leningrad affair⁸⁰, directly connected with A.A. Kuznetsov and the leadership of the Leningrad party organization. Therefore, we will not dwell on this affair in more detail, but will only point out the key ironclad facts connected with this affair:

1. falsification of elections in the Leningrad party organization;
2. an attempt to create a separate Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) within the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks), headed by A.A. Kuznetsov and with a center in Leningrad;
3. creating an atmosphere of sycophancy, subservience and self-praise around oneself;
4. the transformation of Leningrad into a mafia-corrupt viper's nest.

Due to the huge number of illegal actions by A. Kuznetsov and Co., they were arrested on August 13, 1949 and shot on October 1, 1950. They were rehabilitated by their fellow Trotskyists on April 30, 1954. And this faithful ideinical disciple of Zinoviev was engaged in the distribution of leading party, Soviet and economic personnel! Can you imagine the scale of Kuznetsov's bourgeois activity? However, A. Kuznetsov did not work alone, since the Secretariat of the Central Committee, which he chaired, was actually subordinated at that time to the Orgburo of the Central Committee, which was engaged in checking "the work of regional committees, territorial committees, the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of the Union Republics, hearing their reports and taking the necessary measures to improve the work of local party organizations." The Orgburo of the Central Committee was supervised by G. Malenkov. What were the results of such joint activity of two counterrevolutionaries?

⁸⁰ See the excellent work of A.V. Sushkov, "The Leningrad Affair": a general purge of the "cradle of the revolution."

Since July 1946, the counterrevolutionary N.G. Koval became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Moldova. Since August 1946, the counterrevolutionary B.G. Gafurov became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Tajikistan. Since March 1947, the counterrevolutionary N.I. Gusarov became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Belarus. Since December 1947, the counterrevolutionary N.S. Khrushchev again became the First Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (Bolsheviks) of Ukraine. These are just a few examples.

It is not necessary to think that the decisive role here was played by the “voluntarism” of two individuals — Kuznetsov and Malenkov. On the contrary, their will and intentions were dictated by the **objective state of affairs in society**. Kuznetsov and Malenkov did not appoint themselves to the indicated posts, they were democratically elected to these posts by the Plenum of the Central Committee and the Politburo of the Central Committee. In the same way, in the postwar period, we were democratically filled and elected to the party and Komsomol organs in all available instances, from the bottom to the top. The anti-communist philosopher A.A. Zinoviev recalled the class struggle of the bourgeoisie in the postwar period as follows: “... *a crushing blow was dealt to the role of the amateur activist groups, which I have already mentioned. Open mockery of the activists has begun. We have failed several campaigns and personal cases they had started. Denunciations lost their former effectiveness. **Many of the most inveterate and active Stalinists began to fail in elections to Komsomol and party bureaus.***” “Other forms of our struggle were participation in party meetings, sessions of academic councils and departments, symposiums and conferences. Almost all of them turned into small and sometimes serious battles. **The struggle was for every little thing** — for the wording of meeting resolutions, for candidates for party bureaus, for prizes, for recommendations for the publication of books or for rejections. For example, Modrzhinskaya was nominated to the party bureau of the institute every time, and every time we rejected her. Philosophical institutions expanded and multiplied. The number of graduates of educational institutions grew rapidly. They simply began to suppress the Stalinists numerically, not to mention their better education and emancipation.”

In other words, the entire structure of society was spontaneously reproduced in accordance with the existing, still capitalist basis. It was this basis that spontaneously created and reproduced the foundations for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie. Two factors: **subjective** — in the person of a sufficiently strong

bourgeoisie, and **objective** — in the form of a capitalist basis, spontaneously advancing this entire bourgeoisie to all leadership positions. In order for the working class to remain a capitalist in the capitalist-worker relationship, it is necessary to ensure that production, distribution and exchange are carried out **without the mediation of money**. Until money is removed from commodity relations, there can be no talk of socialism. And money can be removed from commodity production only by turning the whole of society into **a single factory**, i.e., by transferring all productive forces into the hands of one single sector — the proletarian state.

On July 10, 1948, a reorganization of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) was carried out, as a result of which the Personnel Department of the Central Committee was abolished, and in its place, production and industry departments were restored. The resolution stated:

“In order to improve the work of the apparatus of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) in selecting personnel and implementing party decisions, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) resolves to have the following departments in the apparatus of the Central Committee, instead of the existing departments:

- a propaganda and agitation department;
- a department of party, trade union and Komsomol organs;
- a department of external relations;
- a department of heavy industry;
- a department of light industry;
- a department of mechanical engineering;
- a transport department;
- an agricultural department;
- an administrative department;
- a planning, financial and trade department.”⁸¹

The propaganda and agitation department was headed by D.T. Shepilov, an active Malenkovite (Bukharinist). The department of party, trade union and Komsomol organs was headed by Khrushchevite (Trotskyist) B.N. Chernousov. The department of external relations was headed by Khrushchevite M.A. Suslov. The

⁸¹ RGASPI. F 17. O. 3. D. 1071. L. 28.

department of heavy industry was headed by Malenkovite S.B. Zadionchenko. The department of light industry was headed by Malenkovite N.M. Pegov. The department of mechanical engineering was headed by Khrushchevite V.M. Churaev. The transport department was headed by Khrushchevite G.A. Chumachenko. The agricultural department was headed by Khrushchevite A.I. Kozlov. The administrative department was headed by Khrushchevite E.E. Andreyev. The planning, finance and trade department was headed by Khrushchevite S.V. Sazonov.

Let us explain here how the characteristics of “Malenkovite” or “Khrushchevite” are given. There is no doubt that all of the above-mentioned individuals were bourgeois counterrevolutionaries — all of them have been promoted up the career ladder since the March counterrevolution of 1953. Only for some of them this promotion turned out to be long-term due to the victory of the spokesman for their interests in the struggle for power — Khrushchev. Or rather they ensured this victory. That is why these bourgeois are Khrushchevites (i.e., Trotskyists). Those who were Malenkovites received party promotion only **briefly** after the counterrevolution, having close ties with Malenkov throughout the postwar period. As for why Khrushchevites are Trotskyists, and Malenkovites are Bukharinists, we will explain later.

The resolution also specifies who will exercise general management:

“To approve the following distribution of duties between the secretaries of the Central Committee for the general management of departments:

- Comrade Zhdanov — the propaganda and agitation department;
- Comrade Malenkov — the department of party, trade union and Komsomol organs and the agricultural department;
- Comrade Suslov — the department of external relations;
- Comrade Kuznetsov — the mechanical engineering department and the administrative department;
- Comrade Ponomarenko — the transport department and the planning-financial-trade department.”

Why did the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) take such measures? The reason for this is precisely A. Kuznetsov’s work as the head of the Personnel Department, created to replace the production and industry departments. Seeing what his work in this post led to, the proletarian part of the Politburo came to a **completely wrong conclusion, beneficial to the**

bourgeoisie (of course, under the influence of this bourgeoisie) — that it is necessary to recreate the previously liquidated production and industry departments.

On February 15, 1949, the communists dealt a blow to some of the Trotskyists (as mentioned above) — the Politburo issued a resolution to remove A.A. Kuznetsov, M.I. Rodionov, and P.S. Popkov from their posts. On July 20, 1949, Malenkovite D.T. Shepilov was relieved of his post as head of the agitation and propaganda sector, and Khrushchevite M.A. Suslov was appointed to this post. And on December 13, 1949, N.S. Khrushchev himself became secretary of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Thus, gradually, various groups of the petty bourgeoisie strengthened their positions in the party...

To sum up, it should be noted that the following were proletarian in essence:

1. the final liquidation of the production and industry departments within the party at the March 1946 Plenum of the Central Committee;
2. the expulsion from the party and destruction of some part of the Trotskyist opposition in 1949.

In turn, the bourgeoisie gained strength due to:



1. control over the distribution of party and other personnel since 1946;
2. the constant replenishment of the highest organs of the party by the bourgeoisie;
3. the restoration of production and industry departments in 1948;
4. the restoration of the Politburo of the Central Committee, liquidated at the XIXth Congress, under the name of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Central Committee immediately after the congress at the Plenum of the Central Committee on October 16, 1952.

2. Class Struggle Within the Organs of State Power and Administration

When examining the class struggle in the organs of state power and administration in the postwar period, the following come to the fore: (1) the problem of the relationship **between the Politburo and the Government**, and (2) **the problem of political relations within the Government itself**. Both problems are in unity, therefore we will examine them as a whole. We will also have to examine separately and in depth such a phenomenon as **production relations in the postwar USSR**.

As is known, by the decree of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR and the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on March 21, 1941, the Bureau of the Soviet of People's Commissars was formed, consisting of the Chairman of the Soviet of People's Commissars and his deputies. The Bureau was engaged in the preparation of quarterly and monthly economic plans, the budget and military orders, the approval of monthly supply plans, quarterly, credit and cash plans, as well as the resolution of current matters. On June 30, 1941, the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR formed the State Defense Committee, headed by Stalin, to whom all party, Soviet, Komsomol and military bodies were unquestioningly subordinate. On December 8, 1942, the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee was created. It supervised and controlled the current activities of all people's commissariats of the defense industry, other important industrial people's commissariats, and also participated in the preparation of and control over the implementation of plans for production and supply in the specified branches of industry and transport with the appropriate provision of everything necessary.

On September 6, 1945, the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR issued a decree "On the Formation of Operational Bureaus of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR." The Bureau of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the



USSR and the Operational Bureau of the State Defense Committee were transformed by this decree into two Operational Bureaus of the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR. One of the Bureaus was in charge of "issues of the work of the People's Commissariats of Defense, the People's Commissariat of Military and Maritime Fleet, agricultural and food commissariats, the People's Commissariats of Trade and Finance, as well as the Committees and Directorates under the Soviet of People's Commissars of the USSR." Its Chairman was V. Molotov. The second Bureau was in charge of "issues of the work of industrial commissariats and railway transport." Its Chairman was L. Beria⁸².

However, on March 20, 1946, these Operational Bureaus were liquidated, and in their place, by a resolution of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR was created. It would seem that the unnecessary bureaucratization of the USSR Soviet of Ministers was removed and the same Bureau of the Soviet of People's Commissars created on March 21, 1941 was recreated. However, this new Bureau of the USSR Soviet of Ministers had a significant difference from the Bureau of the Soviet of People's Commissars. It did not include the Chairman of the USSR Soviet of Ministers (Stalin), and it consisted exclusively of Deputy Chairmen, and L.P. Beria became the Chairman of the Bureau of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, and N.A. Voznesensky and A.N. Kosygin became his deputies. As is known, all three were bourgeois counterrevolutionaries.

And on March 28, 1946, a rather interesting event occurred. The USSR Soviet of Ministers issued a resolution "On the Distribution of Duties in the USSR Soviet of Ministers Between the Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers for Observation Over the Work of Ministries, Committees and Main Directorates." The title of the document makes it clear what innovation was being introduced into the work of the USSR Soviet of Ministers.

We will cite it in full:

"SOVIET OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
Decree No. 674

⁸² GARF. F. R-5446. O. 1. D. 275. L. 35.

March 28, 1946
Moscow, Kremlin

On the distribution of duties in the USSR Soviet of Ministers between the Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers for observation over the work of ministries, committees and main directorates

The Soviet of Ministers of the USSR RESOLVES:

To approve the following distribution of responsibilities in the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR between the Chairman and the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers for observation over the work of ministries, committees, and main administrations:

1. Comrade A.A. ANDREYEV

- Ministry of Agriculture
- Ministry of Livestock Breeding
- Ministry of Technical Crops
- Ministry of Agricultural Machinery Manufacturing
- Main Administration for Forest Protection

2. Comrade L.P. BERIA

- Ministry of Transport Routes (Railways)
- Ministry of Ferrous Metallurgy
- Ministry of Coal Industry of the Western Regions of the USSR
- Ministry of Coal Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR
- Ministry of Oil Industry of the Western and Southern Regions of the USSR
- Ministry of Oil Industry of the Eastern Regions of the USSR
- Ministry of Transport Machine Building
- Ministry of Construction of Fuel Industry Enterprises
- Glavgaztoprom (Main Administration for Gas and Fuel Industry)
- Ministry of Internal Affairs
- Ministry of State Security
- Ministry of State Control

3. Comrade N.A. VOSNESENSKY

- Ministry of Aviation Industry
- Ministry of Heavy Machine Building
- Ministry of Automobile Industry
- Ministry of Machine-Tool Building
- Ministry of Shipbuilding

- Ministry of Construction of Military and Naval Enterprises
 - Ministry of Finance
 - Gosbank (State Bank)
 - Main Administration of State Material Reserves
 - Main Administration of Labor Reserves
 - Committee for Accounting and Distribution of Labor Force
4. Comrade K.E. VOROSHILOV
- Ministry of Maritime Fleet
 - Ministry of River Fleet
 - Ministry of Communications
 - Ministry of Health
 - Ministry of Cinematography
 - Glavsevmorput (Main Administration of the Northern Sea Route)
 - Main Administration of Civil Air Fleet
 - Main Administration of Geodesy and Cartography
 - Main Administration of Meteorological Service Committee on Measures and Measuring Instruments
 - Committee on Arts
 - Committee on Physical Culture and Sports
 - Administration of the Moscow-Volga Canal
 - Union of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
 - Osoaviakhim (Society for the Promotion of Defense, Aircraft and Chemical Construction)
 - Soviet for the Affairs of the Russian Orthodox Church
 - Soviet for the Affairs of Religious Cults
5. Comrade L.M. KAGANOVICH
- Ministry of Construction of Heavy Industry Enterprises
 - Ministry of Construction and Road Machine Building
 - Committee on Architectural Affairs
6. Comrade A.H. KOSYGIN
- Ministry of Textile Industry
 - Ministry of Light Industry
 - Ministry of Timber Industry
 - Ministry of Paper Industry
 - Ministry of Chemical Industry
 - Ministry of Rubber Industry
 - Ministry of Machine and Instrument Building

- Ministry of Electrical Industry
- Ministry of Power Stations
- Committee on Standards
- Glavsnables (Main Administration for Timber Supply)
- Glavkislород (Main Administration of Oxygen Industry)

7. Comrade A.I. MIKOYAN

- Ministry of Food Industry
- Ministry of Meat and Dairy Industry
- Ministry of Fish Industry
- Ministry of Procurements
- Ministry of Non-Ferrous Metallurgy
- Ministry of Trade Centrosoyuz (Central Union of Consumer Societies)
- Glavlesospirt (Main Administration of Timber and Alcohol Industry)
- Glavneftesrab (Main Administration of Oil Supply)
- Glavsnabugol (Main Administration of Coal Supply)
- Committee on Geology

8. Comrade V.M. MOLOTOV

- Ministry of Justice
- Committee on Higher School Affairs
- Committee on Radiofication and Radio Broadcasting
- TASS (Telegraph Agency of the Soviet Union)

9. Comrade J.V. STALIN

- Ministry of Armaments

[Signature of J. Stalin] Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR (J. STALIN)

[Signature of Ya. Chadaev] Administrator of Affairs of the Soviet of the Ministers of the USSR (YA. CHADAEV)”

Who got the juiciest pieces? Stalin, Molotov, Kaganovich and Andreyev got the bones. The juiciest pieces went to the future heroes of the October intra-party and March state counterrevolution. With the exception of Voznesensky, who was shot. But here it only says “**observation**” of the relevant departments.

By the decree of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks) and the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR of February 8, 1947, integrated bureaus were created, to which the following ministries were subordinate:

“In order to improve the work of the Soviet of Ministers in managing the ministries and departments and to ensure that the Soviet of Ministers can consider and resolve the most important national economic issues in a timely manner, to implement the necessary coordination between all sectors of the national economy, especially in connection with the significant increase in the number of Ministries and Committees under the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, and in order to improve the verification of the implementation of Government decisions:

1. To establish the following Bureaus under the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR: Bureau of Agriculture; Bureau of Metallurgy and Chemistry; Bureau of Mechanical Engineering; Bureau of Fuel and Power Plants; Bureau of the Food Industry; Bureau of Transport and Communications; Bureau of Trade and Light Industry; Bureau of Culture and Health.

[...]

6. To approve the following comrades as chairmen of the Bureaus under the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR:

- Bureau of Agriculture — G.M. Malenkov;
- Bureau of Metallurgy and Chemistry — N.A. Voznesensky;
- Bureau of Mechanical Engineering — M.Z. Saburov;
- Bureau of Fuel and Power Plants — L.P. Beria;
- Bureau of the Food Industry — A.I. Mikoyan;
- Bureau of Transport and Communications — L.M. Kaganovich;
- Bureau of Trade and Light Industry — A.N. Kosygin;
- Bureau of Culture and Health — K.E. Voroshilov.”⁸³

It cannot be said that the “observers” received all the ministries they were observing. Moreover, in the same resolution, the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, Stalin, and his first deputy, Molotov, entered the same Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, which was formed on March 20, 1946.

Here we had a certain compromise between the working class and the bourgeoisie — on the one hand, the bourgeoisie received not just supervision, but also leadership of a number of ministries, but on the other hand, the proletarians, the same Stalin,

⁸³ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1063. L. 32–37.

Molotov, Andreyev, strengthened their positions in the general leadership of the Government. Stalinist reforms to split up ministries, begun even before the war, met with a serious obstacle in the form of the Bureau under the Soviet of Ministers for the ministries, which became shackles for these ministries.

Later, some “Bureaucrats” began to strengthen their positions. For example, on February 27, 1947, the Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers issued a resolution on the unification of the Bureau of Transport and Communications with the Bureau of Fuel and Power Plants under the leadership of the bourgeois L. Beria⁸⁴. The communist Kaganovich thus lost “his” Bureau. On September 11, 1947, the Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers issued a resolution, according to which A.A. Kuznetsov was assigned the task of monitoring the work of the Ministry of State Security of the USSR. What Kuznetsov represented has already been said.

In December 1947, the USSR State Planning Committee (headed by Voznesensky) was divided into three committees — the USSR State Planning Committee (headed by the bourgeois Voznesensky), the USSR State Supply Committee (headed by the communist Kaganovich), and the USSR State Engineering Committee (headed by the bourgeois V.A. Malyshev). On the other hand, since 1948, a number of ministries have been consolidated. In 1948–1949, there was a tendency to consolidate ministries⁸⁵, and in 1950–1953, to disaggregate them. What is the reason for such a policy? After all, throughout the 1930s and beginning in 1943, the Bolsheviks pursued a policy of fragmenting ministries. Stalin, in his report to the XVIIth Party Congress (1934), pointed out that in order to combat bureaucracy and red tape it was necessary to break up the People’s Commissariats, Main Directorates and Trusts, and bring economic management closer to the enterprise. The People’s Commissariats (Ministries) and departments of state administration have nothing to do with the dictatorship of the proletariat. They are a remnant of the bourgeois system of administration, organized bureaucratically. The larger the ministry, the more influence and weight this part of the bureaucratic apparatus has (relative to the other parts), the more authority the ministry’s leadership has. And vice versa, the more a ministry is broken up, the less its influence and possibilities, the closer the ministry’s leadership is to the enterprises of this ministry. That is precisely why it is

⁸⁴ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1064. L. 12.

⁸⁵ See Meetings of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR of the 2nd convocation.

in the interests of the working class, when it is in power, to break up the ministries and bring this process to the point where the ministries as such become unnecessary, disappear and transfer the remainder of their authority to the proletarian, permanent bodies — the Soviets. And the policy pursued in 1948–1949, aimed at consolidating ministries, was an expression of the interests of the bourgeois part of the party and of the state apparatus.

On July 30, 1949, the USSR Soviet of Ministers issued a resolution “On the Transformation of the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers Into the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR.” In accordance with this resolution, the Bureau of the Soviet of Ministers was transformed into a broader Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, which, in addition to the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers and his deputies, included the Minister of Finance of the USSR and the Minister of State Control of the USSR.

As early as April 7, 1950, the “Resolution of the Politburo on the Formation and Procedure of Work of the Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR” was issued, in accordance with which (1) the counterrevolutionary N.A. Bulganin was appointed First Deputy Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, (2) the Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR was formed, which included the Chairman, his First Deputy, and also some Deputy Chairmen — L.P. Beria, L.M. Kaganovich, A.I. Mikoyan, V.M. Molotov. In the absence of Stalin, Bulganin was assigned to chair the meetings of the Bureau and the Presidium⁸⁶. The draft resolution itself was presented by Bulganin to Stalin on April 6 “in accordance with the decision of the Politburo.”⁸⁷ If the decision to form the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR was made by a resolution of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR itself in accordance with paragraphs 66–67 of the Constitution of the USSR, then the decision to create a certain Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR was made by the Politburo of the Central Committee of the All-Union Communist Party (Bolsheviks). Again, the situation is the same as with the production and industry departments. Like these departments, the Politburo is not authorized by anyone to directly interfere in the work of any state structures. The Politburo does not bear any responsibility or

⁸⁶ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1080. L. 81.

⁸⁷ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 163. D. 1545. L. 164.

accountability to the one who forms the Government, i.e., to the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. We have already said that Stalin and other communists at the XIXth Party Congress decided to abolish the Politburo, which was mostly bourgeois in composition and had political functions, in order to prevent its bourgeois influence on the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR. And here we see the reasons that prompted the communists to take such a step. The Politburo regularly interfered in the work of the USSR Soviet of Ministers and made corresponding resolutions, in this case a resolution that sharply increased the influence of the counterrevolutionary Bulganin in the USSR Soviet of Ministers. **Stalin himself was in the minority of the Politburo, so he was forced to obey its decisions.** In the event that the Central Committee did not have such an organ as the Politburo, the Chairman of the Government could already make changes independently — this is what Stalin wanted. In this situation, it was precisely in the interests of the proletariat.

Bulganin, having become the First Deputy Chairman, significantly strengthened his position in the future. In particular, on February 16, 1951, a resolution of the Central Committee and the Soviet of Ministers was issued, in accordance with which the Bureau for Military-Industrial and Military Issues was formed, which included all ministries related to military and military-industrial issues. N.A. Bulganin became the Chairman of this Bureau. In the same resolution of February 16, there was a point with the question of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR. And this point says:

“The chairmanship of the meetings of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR and the Bureau of the Presidium of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR shall be assigned in turn to the Deputy Chairmen of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade Bulganin, Beria and Malenkov, also instructing them to **consider and resolve current matters**. Resolutions and orders of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR shall be issued under the signature of the Chairman of the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR, Comrade J.V. Stalin.”⁸⁸

On March 15, 1951, the Politburo issued another resolution on the liquidation of a number of sectoral bureaus under the USSR Soviet of Ministers, in accordance with which the bureaus for the fuel industry, agriculture and procurement, transport and communications, metallurgy and geology, and culture were liquidated. The issues

⁸⁸ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1087. L. 56.

decided in these bureaus were to be considered directly by the Bureau and the Presidium of the USSR Soviet of Ministers. L.P. Beria supervised these issues⁸⁹.

In all these decisions we see one definite tendency — the growing conflict between the productive forces and the production relations of Soviet society. To understand this tendency, it is necessary to recall what production relations are, because everyone has only a general idea of what they are. **Production relations** are relations between people that develop in the process of their material production. These relations are expressed (1) as property relations, (2) as distribution relations.

Property relations characterize which people (classes) that have entered into production relations own the means of production and appropriate the produced product.

Distribution relations include:

1. the distribution of the means of production between different classes of society, determined by the form of ownership;
2. *the distribution of producers* in their social division of labor;
3. *the distribution of produced products* between different classes of society.

Here we will have to reveal another theoretical aspect connected with production relations. Does the contradiction between the productive forces and the production relations disappear with the establishment of the dictatorship of the proletariat and during the entire transition period? Absolutely not. That is why we need a transition period from capitalism to communism, where the second develops from the first, in order to eliminate this contradiction. The main contradiction of capitalism between the communist (social) character of the productive forces and the private character of production relations **remains throughout the entire transition period**. If the owner is **a part** of society (it does not matter whether it is one person or a group of people), then the nature of this property (i.e., appropriation) remains **private**. Having taken state power into its own hands, having organized itself into a ruling class, the proletariat still remains **a part** of society. Therefore, the appropriation and distribution carried out by the proletariat as a state is of a **private** nature. Only when all members of society become the proletariat, a ruling class, does society rise above

⁸⁹ RGASPI. F. 17. O. 3. D. 1088. L. 2.

the state (for the first time in history) and the state dies away (the state is needed only when one part of society needs to suppress another part). The **transition to public property**, to public appropriation and distribution of material life takes place. And this is already communism, where productive forces and production relations **completely coincide**.

What should the proletariat do in the transition period to gradually eliminate this contradiction? It is logical to gradually turn all members of society into proletarians, into the ruling class. And for this, it is necessary to have as a **preliminary** condition the **involvement of all workers in the management of the state** (what is called proletarian socialism). From the moment when all workers began to manage the state one by one, the said gradual process of turning all members of society into proletarians **begins** (and as long as the capitalist environment remains, it is impossible to fully implement this — elements will be reproduced in society that will need to be suppressed, which is why communism in a single country is impossible).

In this case, we are interested in the period of building socialism. This is the period of gradual involvement of all workers in the management of the state, which means the gradual destruction of the bureaucratic apparatus of government and the construction of a non-bureaucratic (proletarian) one in its place. The policy of involving all workers in the management of the state is carried out by the vanguard of the proletariat, i.e., the advanced (Marxist-literate) part of it. By virtue of this criterion, which determines whether the “communist party” is an organization of the vanguard of the proletariat or not, it can be considered as the implementation of this policy.

So, during the period of building socialism, the proletariat is divided into two parts. One is the conscious part, united in the ruling party, governing the state, the other is the unconscious part, which is not involved in governance. Of course, the second part is much larger, especially at the beginning of building socialism. The conscious part faces the task of making all proletarians conscious, involving them in governing the state.

In order to solve this problem, the conscious part of the proletariat must control its organization (i.e., the ruling party) completely. For within the ruling party, in addition to the conscious workers, there are also conscious bourgeois who are **not interested** in involving the workers in the management of the state, and whose goal is to take power into their own hands.

If the conscious proletarians control their party completely, then this ensures their control over the state and movement towards overcoming the contradiction between the productive forces and the relations of production. The relations of production, thanks to this movement (this policy), are constantly, as far as is generally possible in the transition period, **adjusted** to the productive forces.

If the bourgeoisie has a majority within the party, then this movement is suspended, and the said contradiction results in a **conflict** between the productive forces and the relations of production. What does this mean? It means that **the bourgeoisie** has again become the owner of the means of production. It means that the said contradiction has changed from non-antagonistic to antagonistic. In the superstructure, this conflict is expressed as a **bourgeois party and state coup**. Because of this, the decisive factor for the construction of socialism and communism, for overcoming the basic contradiction, is the **balance of class forces in society**, the state of class struggle.

If we talk about the specific expression of production relations in the USSR, how were property relations and distribution relations expressed? **Property relations** were expressed as the state's possession of the means of production. And what is the state? It is the proletariat organized into the ruling class. And it is organized through the system of Soviets and mainly through the **Supreme Soviet of the USSR**. **Distribution relations** were expressed through the **activities of the Government of the USSR** — the Soviet of Ministers of the USSR. It was the Government, on behalf of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR, that was engaged in the distribution of the means of production, producers and manufactured products. In order to constantly adjust production relations to the developing productive forces, it is necessary to have complete subordination and accountability of the distribution organ (or distribution relations) to the ownership organ (or property relations), and to reform the distribution organ in such a way that it merges with the ownership organ. The unity of distribution relations with property relations is the starting point of proletarian socialism. For this, as has already been said, it is necessary to gradually transfer the remnants of the extremely disaggregated ministries to the Soviets themselves. If any other organ, especially one consisting in the majority of the bourgeoisie, constantly interferes with the work of the USSR Soviet of Ministers, then we end up with a **conflict between the productive forces and the relations of production**. The conflict between property relations and distribution relations leads directly to a conflict between the relations of production and the productive forces.

Conclusion

From all that has been said, we can draw the following conclusion. Stalin could not be politically active in the postwar period due to the fact that intense work during the Great Patriotic War had seriously affected his health. He could not take an active part in making a number of decisions. At the same time, his closest comrade-in-arms, who oversaw all worldview matters in the country, A. Zhdanov, was killed. Moreover, the petty-bourgeois opposition was gradually gaining strength and successfully seizing power, first in the party in October 1952, then in the state in March 1953. It must be said that in the country in the postwar period, the preconditions for the seizure of power by the bourgeoisie, i.e., for the dictatorship of the bourgeoisie, were formed.

